

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

STATE AND

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

Edited by
DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL

2014.

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

ing
can

der
in
on
of
ies

CHAPTER 28

EDUCATION POLICY

PAUL MANNA

THOSE hoping to better understand subnational governments would be well served to develop some expertise in education policy.¹ Clearly, all scholars of state and local settings need not make education their primary focus. Still, education has a major influence on the contexts in which subnational governments operate. The provision of education is a key area outlined in state constitutions. The nation's schools and universities consume large fractions of state and local budgets. Leaders at all levels of government and across time have touted the crucial role that education plays in sustaining the nation's economy and democracy. Recognizing education's importance in subnational settings, scholars working across various subfields of political science and public administration have found this policy area valuable for theory development and empirical study.²

Scholars of political institutions frequently note that states and localities provide useful variation to test theories originally developed in national venues. In education, multiple institutions have some hand in governing the production and implementation of policies that influence the nation's schools and universities (Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot, 1964; Campbell and Mazzone, 1976; Lowry, 2001; Hicklin and Meier, 2008; Wirt and Kirst, 2009). They include state boards that oversee different aspects of elementary and secondary schooling, higher education, and in some cases vocational learning. Further, state education agencies, whose leaders can be elected or appointed, are the administrative workhorses that dispense federal and state funds, provide technical assistance, and direct implementation of state and federal policy.

Local institutions that govern education also vary. Today, the United States contains approximately 14,000 school districts (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Howell, 2005). In addition, a small but growing number of urban areas have empowered city mayors to choose the local superintendent, a function traditionally possessed by elected school boards (Henig and Rich, 2004; Wong et al., 2007). The emergence of public charter schools since the early 1990s, which are relieved of many regulatory requirements that apply to traditional public schools, have created new governing and oversight challenges (Shober, Manna, and Witte, 2006; Schneider and Buckley, 2007; Henig, 2008).

Additionally, state and local education policy provides openings for research on the political behavior of individuals and groups. These include opportunities for testing claims about the impact of different methods for choosing leaders, how those leaders represent their constituents, decision making among policy elites, and how citizens' choices affect educational and other outcomes (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall, 2000; Meier, O'Toole, and Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Henig, 2009; Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah, 2010). Interest groups and extragovernmental organizations can have much influence on education through policy advocacy, lobbying, and campaign work or contributions. Atop the list of influencers are the nation's two major teacher unions—the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers—and various business groups. Other extragovernmental organizations wield power as philanthropic grant givers or service providers. For example, states and localities spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually in contracts with companies that develop and score standardized tests, produce textbooks, teacher guides, and computer technology, or provide tutoring services.

Finally, subnational education policy and politics present research opportunities for scholars of public management, administration, and bureaucracy (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 2000; Meier et al., 2005; Manna, 2010). At the street level, teachers and other school staff confront ambiguous and sometimes conflicting laws or regulations, all the while teaching students from diverse backgrounds. As such, they wield much power to define the content of policy through their actions (Lipsky, 1980). Staff in district offices, state agencies, and the federal education department confront their own challenges as they administer dozens of programs that frequently exist in tension. Overall, during the past two decades the stakes for educational administration have increased as the states and federal government have embraced policies to promote accountability for educational performance.

This chapter's remaining discussion is designed to illustrate, not comprehensively describe, major streams of scholarship on state and local education policy from the past few decades. It focuses on three broad areas: markets, governance, and representation. That categorization provides a simple heuristic, rather than a clear delineation between major research programs. As readers will see, several works discussed below cut across these categories.

EDUCATION AND MARKETS

Policies that promote school choice represent robust expressions of local control. Studies of local educational markets have addressed several specific research questions. Does school choice influence school operations and student outcomes? How do parents make decisions when they choose their children's schools? To what extent do local markets for education create positive or negative externalities that may influence the quality of education and democracy? These questions have important implications for how

local markets for education are likely to function in practice. Answering them can also provide broader theoretical insights about institutional design and political behavior.

Markets versus Democratic Control

Energetic scholarly debates have focused on the potential educational outcomes that public institutions and markets might produce. Two of the most important scholars in this debate have been Chubb and Moe (1988, 1990), who helped influence numerous research agendas with their 1990 book, *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools*. In that work, the authors argue that public schools are destined to underperform because they are creatures of democratic control. Chubb and Moe (1990) note that policy makers in democracies must forge compromises to broker competing demands from various constituents; as a result, public schools must fulfill the desires of sometimes disparate groups, which attenuates school performance. Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that market systems work much differently. Those systems set free school-level leaders, teachers, and parents to organize school operations and select staff and curriculum based on criteria that the school itself deems important. That insulation from external interests, the authors argue, results in schools that better serve parents and their children, the most important consumers of education.

Chubb and Moe's (1990) provocative findings and recommendations for adopting school vouchers to improve educational performance prompted responses from other scholars. Henig (1994, 241) cautioned that "sharp and periodic reform efforts may accomplish less, in the long run, than sustained efforts that take time to nurture a supportive constituency and to solidify and institutionalize gains as they occur." The attractiveness of the market metaphor, Henig argues, is particularly appealing amidst perceptions—and in some communities the reality—that traditional public schools have struggled. Henig (1994, 146) summarizes the mixed track record of choice and other market-based reforms and notes the irony that "the study [Chubb and Moe, 1990] that has lent the greatest credence to the claim that 'choice works' does not include any direct indicators of choice at all." The upshot of Henig's (1994) work is that choice may indeed be a useful arrow in the quiver of education reformers, but broad improvements will require a reinvigorated sense of collective purpose, which narrow, market-based reforms are likely to undercut.

In a separate response, Smith and Meier (1994, 1995-) challenged the premise that bureaucracy necessarily promotes poor educational outcomes. Instead, they argue that increased bureaucratization (e.g., employing more staff and creating new programs) is a response to community needs. In other words, poor performance promotes a search for solutions and therefore increases bureaucracy, rather than bureaucracy undermining performance. Looking at data across state and local levels (and offering some international comparisons), they find that many of the education reforms of the 1980s that emerged after Chubb and Moe's (1990) data were collected, such as increasing course-taking requirements for students and adding requirements for prospective

teachers, were positively associated with student outcomes. Further, direct measures of democratic control, such as whether local school districts elected their superintendent, had no effect. Elected superintendents were also associated with less bureaucracy, as measured by the number of school officials per student.

In a subsequent study, Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle (2000) used eight years of data from over 1,000 school districts in Texas to show that poor school performance produces larger bureaucracies as districts attempt to respond to perceived needs. In so doing, the authors make a larger theoretical point, while crediting Chubb and Moe (1990) for offering a framework that invited careful thinking about institutions. Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle (2000, 590) note that the issues at stake "are relevant not only to public policy debates but are also testable propositions that promise theoretical insight into how institutions respond to and influence their environments."

Outcomes in Local Markets

The emergence of public and privately funded school voucher programs during the 1990s further sharpened debates about educational markets and student achievement (Witte, 1998; Witte, 2000; Howell and Peterson, 2002; Howell, 2004). Those programs and the systematic evaluations accompanying them allowed political scientists (and other scholars) to more directly examine whether choice improved educational outcomes. A lively empirical debate about vouchers' effectiveness ensued, which frequently turned on methodological questions about how to account for selection bias and whether the policy experiments that seemed to provide great analytical leverage actually held up in practice. Although the arguments were sometimes intense and the published work voluminous, two key findings emerged. First, authors uniformly found that parents who chose their children's schools were more satisfied than parents who did not choose. Second, some achievement gains were apparent for voucher recipients, but they tended to be limited to certain student groups, or confined to particular subjects or grade levels. No evidence suggested that students using school vouchers did systematically worse than their peers.

Markets for education depend upon schools supplying educational services, but they also need parents who are willing and prepared to choose their children's schools. That requirement places parents in a challenging position for two reasons: schools are multidimensional institutions that can be difficult to evaluate, and choice presents parents with unfamiliar duties, given that most students attend schools based on their residency within an attendance boundary. Do these demands on parents suggest that educational markets may cease to function well?

In a research program focussing on consumer decision making in local markets for education, Schneider and several colleagues have examined that question in detail (Teske et al., 1993; Schneider et al., 1997a; Schneider et al., 1997b; Schneider et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 2000). These authors suggest that markets can promote beneficial outcomes even if all parents lack good information. That result is conditional upon

the presence of at least some parents who serve as “marginal consumers,” those who become knowledgeable about local school characteristics. Integrating scholarship on political behavior, networks, political psychology, and economics, Schneider, Teske, and Marschall (2000, 270) conclude their award-winning book, *Choosing Schools: Consumer Choice and the Quality of American Schools*, by observing that “Competitive markets do not need all consumers to be informed—competitive pressures can result even if a relatively small subset of consumers engage in informed, self-interested search.”

The authors reach these conclusions using a creative research design involving four public school districts: Community districts 1 and 4 in New York City and in neighboring New Jersey, the Montclair Public Schools and the Morris School District. District 4 and Montclair incorporated public school choice, while the other two districts did not. Overall, the authors are not as optimistic as Chubb and Moe (1990, 217) that choice is a “panacea” that will eliminate the nation’s educational ills. Nevertheless, Schneider, Teske, and Marschall (2000) note that on balance, choice tends to benefit the families that choose, although modestly, while not disadvantaging those who do not. Still, the authors caution that the discussion networks in which some parents participate are likely to provide better access to knowledgeable marginal consumers than others (Schneider et al., 1997b; Schneider, Teske, and Marschall, 2000). And further, the quality of those discussion networks are often driven by class or race, with more advantaged parents having access to more and better information.

Future Research

Political scientists and public administration scholars have contributed to a robust literature on school choice that has tested theories about market behavior and bureaucratic organizations, the academic performance of choice schools, and the ability of parents to meet the demands required for educational markets to function well. Despite these advances, several dimensions of school choice remain relatively unexplored. Consider three areas in particular.

First, research on the effects of school choice has tended to focus on student test score outcomes as the measure of program success. Although some have considered implications of choice on tolerance and adherence to democratic norms (Wolf, 2005) and recent (unpublished) evaluations of choice programs in Milwaukee and Washington, DC have studied additional outcomes, generally the best research designs and data have focused on student achievement in reading and math. Other outcomes deserve deeper examination, given that parents consider several ideas, beyond student achievement, when they choose schools (Howell, 2004; Schneider and Buckley, 2007).

Second, debates about whether choice influences certain outcomes are also somewhat limited, given that researchers have tended to leave schools’ daily operations in unopened black boxes. Thus, in a multiple regression context, an independent variable tapping participation in a choice program (e.g., a student received a voucher or not; a student chose a charter school or not) may suggest achievement gains for students who

choose, but what remains unknown are the practices the choice schools are pursuing that produce those results. Scholars should be more willing to engage schools on the ground level to study these practices.³

Finally, the literature has hardly considered the behavior of educational suppliers in markets for school choice. One premise of market-based reforms is that schools will adapt to compete for students. Yet just like parents, school leaders themselves face information problems when they interpret the signals that parents send when they leave or enter a particular school. Sometimes parents leave schools, although they appear quite satisfied with the quality of the academic program, teachers, school leadership, and safety. How schools and districts respond to competitive pressures is one area ripe with opportunity (Teske et al., 2001; Hess, 2002; Manna, 2002; Witte Schlomer, and Shober, 2007).

EDUCATION AND GOVERNANCE

Unlike the concept of “government,” which suggests a relatively narrow focus on public institutions, the more multidimensional “governance” invites scholars to consider how those institutions can influence public and private actors as they manage a diverse menu of programs and policy tools.⁴ Scholars have considered several ways that governance might influence public officials as they develop and implement education policy. How do local school system leaders define their agendas and manage policy given their political, financial, and institutional constraints? How do intergovernmental relationships influence these same local leaders, as well as administrators or elected officials at the state and federal level? What unique issues must state leaders confront as they oversee local systems, while simultaneously serving as conduits for federal policies and resources directed to influence local schooling? This section considers those questions by examining local leadership, local management and administration, and state politics and policy.

Local Leadership

Discussions about school board leadership have received increasing attention from political scientists and other scholars (Howell, 2005; Berry and West, 2010). In the current policy environment, people are beginning to question whether elected local boards themselves are viable entities for overseeing the nation’s nearly 100,000 schools. The rise of the state standards movement and efforts to hold localities accountable for student learning has attenuated local control over curriculum, for example. Answering challenging technical questions, such as how to educate children with disabilities or those who are still learning English, often seem beyond the scope of what local boards, with their citizen leaders who often lack expertise in teaching or assessment, can manage.

Beyond board leadership, researchers have also examined local chief executives, either district superintendents or mayors who lead their city public schools. Studies of superintendents and mayors have identified a complicated web of constraints that challenge these individuals to produce policy agendas that simultaneously satisfy their constituents and improve student learning (Hess, 1999; Henig and Rich, 2004; Wong et al., 2007). Theoretically, scholars have identified models relating leadership to local outcomes. This work sometimes even suggests implications for leadership in other contexts and at other levels of government (Henig, 2009).

Hess's (1999) study of superintendents considers the incentives facing these district leaders as they build their policy agendas. Superintendents work under several constraints that limit their effectiveness. Urban school systems have tended to be "organizations with little accountability, difficult-to-control technical cores, and intense public scrutiny" (Hess, 1999, 31). Those factors and personal incentives that drive leaders to improve their own personal reputations lead them frequently to advance new initiatives, rather than seeing through potentially promising reforms of their predecessors. The ironic result, Hess (1999) notes, is that urban districts commonly experience too much, not too little, reform. The tendency of new leaders to overhaul existing approaches inevitably produces disappointment when improvements do not occur in the narrow timeframes that superintendents have promised.

School boards and superintendents have led nearly all American school systems for most of the country's history. Within the past decade or so mayoral control has emerged as an alternative in some urban districts. In these systems, mayors have captured traditional board functions: they choose school superintendents, set instructional agendas for schools, hire and fire central office and school personnel, open and close schools, and manage district funds. The theoretical arguments favoring mayoral control suggest that centralizing power over schools in city hall will eliminate the perverse incentives that Hess (1999) discusses, which drive districts to focus on symbolic, rather than substantive, reforms.

Although mayoral control is relatively rare, high-profile cases in New York City and the District of Columbia (among other places) have received much attention. Scholars have begun to examine the theoretical arguments for this approach and to develop empirical studies to test them. One example is the edited collection from Henig and Rich (2004), which presents case studies in six large, urban districts with mayoral control. In synthesizing the findings of these diverse cases, the editors conclude with a sense of "wary skepticism" about the potential for mayoral control to deliver on its promises (Henig and Rich, 2004, 251). The reason, the authors argue, is that improving urban education ultimately requires a strong collective commitment to address several factors that can undermine positive change. Given the right intersection of circumstances and a politically talented mayor, mayoral control may indeed foster improvements. But the editors and some contributors are not sanguine, given that there are many ways that the tight logic behind mayor-led systems may break down in practice (Meier, 2004).

In another major study, Wong and co-authors (2007) use a large-N statistical analysis to examine policy change in finance and staffing, student outcomes, and dynamics

of local politics in cities with mayoral control. The authors note that mayoral control of schools is not randomly distributed across the country. Thus, they use a careful research design that generates a purposeful sample of 104 districts without mayoral control, which they compare to the 10 districts they identified with mayoral control. The authors' overall findings show that mayoral leadership is associated with higher reading and math achievement among elementary school students, more financial resources for instruction and less for administration, and higher placement of education on local political agendas. Those findings, they argue, "suggests that the first wave of mayoral control has been a success" (Wong et al., 2007, 198). The book's larger theoretical point shows how institutions can create enabling conditions that leaders may then leverage to improve organizational performance.

Local Management and Administration

In addition to studies examining how superintendents and mayors define reform agendas, other work has probed more detailed behaviors of leaders and managers as they administer regular school district functions. Most prominent among such work is the research program of Kenneth Meier and multiple collaborators, who have studied Texas school districts to develop more general insights about public management and administration.⁵ A breezy overview of those studies (Meier, 2009) reveals that they have illuminated numerous factors influencing district operations, while simultaneously offering insights on larger theoretical questions. Consider two specific examples.

First is the matter of political control of the bureaucracy, a major focus of political scientists who study institutions. Much of this work in the discipline proceeds using principal-agent models, which presume asymmetries of goals and resources between political overseers of the bureaucracy (elected officials) and workers in government agencies (bureaucrats). A problematic assumption in that literature, argue Meier and O'Toole (2006), is that agency bureaucrats' preferences are assumed, rather than measured empirically and incorporated into models examining political control. In their work, these authors have shown "bureaucratic values to be far more influential in explaining bureaucratic outputs and outcomes than political factors" (Meier and O'Toole, 2006, 177). The theoretical upshot of these findings is potentially huge, especially if parallel results emerge in other settings with different data. Empirically, the authors urge subsequent researchers to "bring the bureaucracy back into the study of bureaucratic control," while noting how "apparent theoretical and practical insights" about control of the bureaucracy "should be critically reexamined" (Meier and O'Toole, 2006, 187).

A second issue concerns the development and operation of policy networks in public education. Networked actors are often considered superior to traditional hierarchical organizational forms, given the former's ability to react swiftly to changing circumstances, adapt to client needs, and invite participation from groups inside and outside government that possess specialized expertise. Meier and O'Toole have also used the

Texas case to examine administrative behavior in policy networks (Meier and O'Toole, 2001; Meier and O'Toole, 2003; Meier and O'Toole, 2004; O'Toole and Meier, 2004).

Conceptually, they agree that scholars have identified several ways that networks influence policy implementation, yet they highlight that the literature has struggled to show the impact of network management on policy outputs and outcomes. In one study, Meier and O'Toole (2003) examine the degree to which district superintendents built ties to key network actors: school board members, local business elites, other superintendents, state agency leaders and staff, and state legislators. The authors find that superintendents with more network connections tend to report greater district support from their local school boards, parents, and the overall community, suggesting that managers who build network ties see dividends from their actions. Further, the authors show that the impact of networking differs depending on local performance and context. Overall, the findings suggest that network management can be "an important tool for administrative success" (Meier and O'Toole, 2003, 697). Still, network outcomes are not uniformly positive. In a separate article, O'Toole and Meier (2004) examine the politics of network management. They show how networks can have "dark sides," which bias network outcomes toward more advantaged participants. In more general terms, the findings show how public administration and management can influence distributional politics.

State Politics and Policy

In addition to work on ground-level conditions that affect local school leaders and administrators, scholars have examined the broader intergovernmental forces influencing educational governance and management. The federal government's increasing levels of interest and involvement in education have energized scholarly studies of educational federalism. Although this overall volume is about state and local government, researchers examining state and local education policy must still engage the federal role. The main reason is that essentially all major federal education policies are administered by states and local school districts. Subnational policy choices themselves have tremendous influence on how federal policy operates.

Because federal policy implementation is dependent on subnational capacities and political contexts, researchers have focused much energy on the tension between the interests of federal program designers (in Congress and the federal bureaucracy) and state and local implementers. Chubb's (1985a, 1985b) analyses of federal education initiatives, while providing insights about implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and federal vocational education programs, helped contribute to broader debates about the nature of federal influence over state policy. Theoretically, Chubb's articles use education to address questions about regulation ("When is it likely to be excessive?"), oversight ("Under what conditions does monitoring reveal its impact?"), and program design ("When are grant recipients responsive to incentives?"). One broad implication of these studies is the need to develop research that simultaneously

examines the economic relationships that federal grants establish and the political interests that motivate the givers and receivers of grant funds.

During the past decade, passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) has renewed interest in the relationship between local, state, and federal governments in education. Empirically, scholars have debated the extent to which NCLB has fundamentally reshaped educational federalism or whether persistent patterns of state and local dominance have persisted (McDermott and Jensen, 2005; McDonnell, 2005; McGuinn, 2005, 2006; Manna, 2006a; Wong and Sunderman 2007; Lowry, 2009; Manna, 2010). Theoretically, work on state-federal relations in education has, like Chubb's (1985a, 1985b) earlier contributions, prompted discussions about how federalism influences agenda setting (Manna, 2006b), and whether different models may be required, depending on the arena of education (pre-school, elementary and secondary, or higher education) under consideration (Lowry, 2009).

As this chapter's other sections show, the most developed research agendas on education in subnational governments have tended to focus on localities. Still, valuable work on the states themselves has emerged. Notably, Mintrom's studies (sometimes in collaboration with Vergari) have helped to bridge theoretical gaps between research on policy entrepreneurship, agenda setting, policy networks, and the diffusion of state policy innovations (Mintrom, 1997a; Mintrom, 1997b; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Mintrom, 2000). In his work, Mintrom uses original survey data of state policy entrepreneurs interested in school choice to examine how these advocates develop and promote their ideas. Although he focusses on the choice debate, Mintrom's theoretical propositions, research design, and results show how diffusion studies could be greatly enhanced by taking more direct account of entrepreneurs' actions. One interesting connection that such studies commonly miss, he notes, is the degree to which advocates working at the state level frequently draw upon and promote successes of local reforms. Thus, his work calls our attention to a "state-local nexus" (Mintrom, 1997b), which suggests diffusion processes operating simultaneously in horizontal (state to state) and vertical (state and local) ways.

Other state-level work has examined policy diffusion and the ways leaders manage ideas and institutions amidst challenges from other state actors, competing levels of government, and interest groups. Shober's (2010) book uses qualitative and advanced quantitative methods to study how state leaders in Georgia, Ohio, and Wisconsin developed and administered reform during the 1980s and 1990s. In so doing, he identifies two key variables—scope and autonomy—that influence agency success and have broad theoretical applicability for studies beyond education. State-centered studies on pre-school education have explored related ideas. Such work has helped to examine the efficacy of state approaches versus federal ones (Gormley and Phillips, 2005), the dynamics of interest group behavior and the diffusion of ideas (Karch, 2010), and the factors associated with pre-school investments (Rigby, 2007).

Studies of state higher education policy have exploited institutional variation to examine how structures and politics affect policy and student opportunities. Lowry (2001, 845) shows how different state governing arrangements influence the costs

borne by students in tuition and fees and how universities spend funds across several functional areas. Theoretically, the results have implications for hierarchical control of bureaucratic agencies, the influence of politics on management, and the degree to which different institutional designs might produce similar outcomes. Other work exploiting variation in post-secondary education includes Knott and Payne (2004), who develop a classification scheme of higher education governance structures to investigate how structure influences revenue streams and scholarly productivity, and Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) who show that structural choices can condition the influence of politics on state education finance. Finally, Hicklin and Meier (2008) focus on student outcomes and show that variation in higher education governance influences minority enrollments.

Future Research

While the literature in this section contains suggestions for pushing forward specific lines of inquiry, two additional areas seem ripe for future study. An initial area concerns administrative capacity. In my own experience, discussing education with policy makers and government administrators, everyone seems to agree that the capacity to implement policy is a hugely important variable influencing why policies succeed or fail. While that claim has some intuitive appeal, empirically the discussions are somewhat murky because “capacity” remains an elusive concept. Political scientists who are interested in educational governance could make important theoretical and empirical contributions by fleshing out this idea in more nuanced ways than is common in social science research, which frequently operationalizes capacity by counting up agency personnel, considering agency budget size, and sometimes enumerating the number of external constraints the agency confronts. Those measures are certainly good first cuts at the concept of capacity, but they omit other elements, such as the skill and knowledge of agency staff, the quality of their interactions, and the technical capabilities of their administrative systems, among other things.

Also, the literature on educational governance would benefit from more comparative research designs. Three potential comparisons seem especially promising. First, comparisons of policies addressing different levels of education, as Lowry (2009) has explored, can illustrate whether the institutional and political dynamics of education governance are common across pre-school, elementary and secondary, and higher education. Second, comparing education with other policy areas could reveal even broader theoretical concepts or relationships between institutions, policy, and outcomes, something that Marschall and Ruhil (2007) begin to examine. Finally, comparisons between leaders situated in similar administrative positions across levels of government (e.g., agency executives or managers) can reveal other empirical regularities relevant to institutions and politics. Henig’s (2009) work on presidents, governors, and mayors—what he terms the “new education executives”—is one example.

REPRESENTATION

Scholars frequently have used subnational education policy to study the representation of group interests. Research on state and local education policy has addressed several questions that examine institutions, political behavior, interest groups, and race and politics. What factors influence the representation of minorities on local school boards? Does descriptive representation of different racial groups translate into substantive representation by influencing school policies, practices, and overall reform agendas? To what extent do racial minorities collaborate or compete in campaigns for local school offices? What powers do teacher unions wield in board elections? Do senior citizens pose a threat to school funding in local communities as often is assumed?

Race, Local Politics, and Policy

Consider first the role of race in local school board elections. One strand of this literature has focused on how different electoral systems might influence the descriptive representation of minority groups. A second major strand has examined what happens when members of minority groups serve on local school boards and as administrators and teachers. Rather than only considering electoral outcomes in which race is a dependent variable, these latter studies consider race as an independent variable to study its influence on substantive policy outputs and minority student outcomes. Some work has considered descriptive and substantive representation simultaneously.

Findings regarding descriptive representation have shown that board elections based on at-large representation tend to under-represent minority populations compared to ward-based systems, but the effects are inconsistent. In a study of urban school districts across the United States, Stewart, England, and Meier (1989) reported that blacks tended to be slightly over-represented in ward-based systems, under-represented in systems where board members are appointed, and much more under-represented in districts with at-large elections. In contrast, Meier and colleagues (2005) conducted a similar study and found that ward-based systems tended to attenuate Latino representation on the school board, a finding consistent with Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier (2004), but had no statistically discernible effect on black representation.

More recent work from Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah (2010) has pushed the boundaries of research on descriptive representation and local school boards. These authors have identified two important limitations of prior work. Studies have nearly always focused on proportional representation at a particular moment in time. Further, they have tended to focus on a relatively limited set of independent variables, primarily the rules governing board selection (e.g., at-large, ward-based, or other systems) and the presence of minority groups in a local school district. Focusing on black representation on school boards and using a sample of 345 school districts from 1980 to 2000, Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah (2010) conceive of minority representation as following a two-step

process. First is the initial step of breaking the color barrier on a local school board. The authors argue that going from none to some black representation represents an important substantive step. Second is the amount of black representation that emerges once the color barrier has been broken.

Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah (2010) report several interesting findings that have implications for prior studies and future work. First, they find that the presence of large black populations is most important for overcoming the representation hurdle, although their findings suggest that the probability of black representation is higher in districts with ward-based rather than at-large systems. Second, once blacks have made it over the representation hurdle, they find that an important and hitherto understudied variable—the number of seats on a school board—has a positive effect on black representation. That result holds for both at-large and ward-based systems. The authors conclude by underscoring the importance of board size: “legislative size may be an underappreciated mechanism by which to increase representation, particularly in AL [at-large] systems” (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010, 122–123).

Identifying the factors that may influence minority representation on local school boards begs an important follow-up question. Does descriptive representation translate into substantive representation that benefits minority groups? The empirical findings here tend to indicate that indeed, when members of racial minorities win seats on local school boards, specific practices and policies tend to benefit minority students. Marschall and Ruhil (2007) find evidence that descriptive representation matters at the broadest level of substantive representation, the amount of satisfaction that constituents express in their elected leaders. Using a survey of 3,000 black respondents across 53 school districts, the authors find that blacks were more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction with public schools when blacks served on the local school board or when the city had a black mayor. In addition to reporting these findings, the authors underscore the methodological advantages of studying representation using local governments, especially those overseeing schools. They explain that slightly more than 100 blacks have been elected to Congress since 1869, while there were nearly 1,900 elected to local school boards in the year 2000 alone.

Meier and his colleagues have studied more specific policy outputs to probe connections between descriptive and substantive representation (Fraga, Meier, and England, 1986; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier, 2004; Meier et al., 2005). Focusing on black and Hispanic students, they find direct and indirect links. Board representation of racial minorities is associated with greater numbers of that same minority group being hired into school administrative positions. In contrast, board representation is not directly related to the staffing patterns in a district's schools. However, the authors find indirect effects in that districts with more minority administrators are likely to have more minority teachers. That is perhaps understandable, given that boards commonly play some role in the hiring of district administrators and perhaps even school principals. Yet they delegate to these same administrators the power to hire teachers.

Linking these findings to some of their prior work on the subject, Meier and co-authors (2005, 767) note the importance of these personnel decisions, given that

“both African American and Latino teachers positively influence the educational experience of minority students.” In one of those studies, for example, Meier and England (1984) found that schools with more black teachers were less likely to practice “second generation discrimination” against black students. In other words, these schools were less likely to embrace low expectations for black students, such as assigning them to special education classes, suspending them at higher rates, and discouraging them from enrolling in classes providing academic enrichment.

These findings about descriptive and substantive representation also suggest an important theoretical point. Thinking about the relationships between actors at different levels—from elected positions to agency management to front-line employees—is fundamental to understanding how representation unfolds. As the work discussed in this section and other studies have shown, school districts and schools are valuable institutions for examining these issues (Meier, 1984; Stewart, England, and Meier, 1989; Meier, O’Toole, and Nicholson-Crotty, 2004).

Limits of Descriptive Representation

Interestingly, when considering local reform and educational performance more generally, the link between descriptive and substantive representation seems less sanguine in large urban districts. In their award-winning book, *The Color of School Reform: Race, Politics, and the Challenge of Urban Education*, Henig and colleagues (1999) find that the promise of black leadership in urban school districts is complicated by the myriad ways in which race interacts with local constituencies, persistent challenges, and reform agendas. One important variable that separates this work from that of Meier and his colleagues is that Henig’s group focuses on school reform in minority-led cities—the District of Columbia, Baltimore, Detroit, and Atlanta—whereas Meier’s team examines localities where racial minorities are in the numerical minority.

The optimism that Meier’s studies of minority representation suggest are the launching point for Henig and his team’s work. As an Urban League director from Atlanta noted in the early pages of the book, “I have always believed that if you could ever achieve equity in the administration of the school system, then it would improve the chances of black kids getting a better education” (Henig et al., 1999, 4). The authors find, however, that such optimism about minority leadership in urban districts has not translated into widespread gains in minority achievement. “Indeed,” the authors note, “by most accounts the situation is bleaker than ever” (Henig et al., 1999, 6).

Conceptually, Henig et al. (1999) attempt to explain these educational outcomes in urban areas; they consider how race interacts with local conditions and influences the emergence of crucial civic capacity that can sustain educational reforms and improve educational outcomes for minority students. Their theoretical model posits that reform outcomes depend on the interaction of two key variables: the degree to which a city’s politics is “racialized” and the amount of “fragmentation” among local groups, both

inside and outside government, who can influence a city's education agenda. Henig et al.'s (1999) primary conclusions are that race remains a salient variable in local educational politics and, given that salience, it is incredibly difficult to maintain the local coalitions needed to sustain successful school reform agendas.

Other Group Interests

Beyond matters of race and representation, political scientists and public administration scholars have considered group interests in other contexts. Consider these two relatively recent illustrative examples. The initial one focuses on teacher unions, a powerful group in contemporary education policymaking. Given unions' strength, Moe (2006, 2009) has noted the empirical need for researchers to examine their substantive influence on politics and student outcomes, which he has studied by examining how unions affect school board elections and student achievement. Moe's theoretical insight is that teacher unions complicate traditional assumptions about principal-agent relationships between management and labor.

As Moe (2006) shows, teachers acting in local settings, often via union mobilization, have powerful impacts on the individuals who serve in school management positions. The reason is because teachers can strongly influence school board elections (where turnout typically is low) and therefore have a strong hand in choosing their overseers. Theoretically, this fact suggests that typical assumptions about principals and their ability to hold agents accountable for performance require rethinking and additional empirical study.

Another example is Berkman and Plutzer's (2005) study of policymaking in school districts. Their work attempts to study connections between local interests and school finance by considering a fundamental question about American democracy: Are local school districts responsive to the policy preferences of their constituents? Methodologically, the authors develop an innovative approach, called small polity inference, in which they leverage national and state-level public opinion data to infer citizen preferences in local districts. As a result, the authors become the first to "compare preferences for spending with actual spending in nearly all American school districts" (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005, xvi). Their findings have implications for the design of local rules for choosing school board members.

Further, Berkman and Plutzer (2005) examine teacher unions and another group, elderly citizens, to consider how these groups influence school finance decisions. Their findings regarding the elderly are particularly interesting. The authors show that the majority of elderly citizens are more likely to support school spending than others. That finding is contingent upon the elderly living in communities where "local property taxes generate a meaningful proportion of their total operating revenue" (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005, 142). That conclusion highlights how institutional design—here, the allocation of responsibility for funding schools—is associated with concrete policy results.

Future Research

Scholars studying state and local education policy through the lens of representation have produced numerous theoretical and empirical insights. Two additional areas could build on this foundation. First, although prior research has examined how the rules for selecting school board members can influence board composition, local campaigns for school board office have received much less attention. Some work has examined the potential for coalition building across racial minority groups in such elections. But those studies focus on group characteristics of local communities and the institutions that govern member selection, and not on the political behavior of elites on the campaign trail (Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha 2007). The rise of the accountability movement in education has produced much data on student achievement, which in theory was designed to promote transparency and public interest in school performance. It would be interesting to know whether such information has informed campaigns for local board positions.

Second, the same sorts of issues that scholars of local education politics have explored are also ripe for consideration at the state level. Beyond the studies of higher education noted in the prior section and other work that has examined state education policy in the context of American federalism, few scholars have taken up the call of pioneers in this area, who encouraged more rigorous state-level studies to understand how state institutions, activist groups, and political campaigns all intersect to represent competing interests (Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot, 1964). The diversity of state-level institutions responsible for governing education, coupled with the state-level influence of teacher unions and business, provides a great setting for such work (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1976; Wirt and Kirst, 2009).

ADDITIONAL DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Prior sections of this chapter have described key theoretical and empirical findings and suggested how researchers might push forward future studies on educational markets, governance, and representation. This concluding section describes five broader areas that present promising opportunities for scholars interested in these and other topics.

First, although research on subnational education policy has tended to favor local-level over state-level settings, many reasons exist to study the states more carefully (Masters, Salisbury, and Eliot, 1964; Campbell and Mazzoni, 1976; Shober, Manna, and Witte, 2006; Hicklin and Meier, 2008; Karch, 2010; Shober, 2010). The current menu of policies promoting standards-based reform and accountability for educational performance means that state policy choices will become even more consequential in the future. That continued state role and the emergence of more readily accessible data on state policy and performance, coupled with the states' institutional and political diversity, means that state education politics and policy will remain a highly relevant and theoretically promising arena for study.

Second, education policy debates frequently defy simplistic left-right conceptualizations common in the research literature and punditry on American politics. School choice, usually framed as conservative policy, has enjoyed support from an eclectic coalition of groups across the ideological spectrum, including civil rights advocates, business leaders, minority groups, and libertarians. Similarly, Democrats and Republicans, especially governors, have found common ground on standards-based reform. Political views in other education policy areas have tended to fall along more traditional lines, as with sex education, for example. Focusing on state and local settings, researchers could explore the different partisan and ideological coalitions that form around various education policies. That research would help build on prior state-policy work in these general areas (Wong and Shen, 2002; McDermott, 2003) and potentially produce new understandings of what it means for citizens to espouse particular ideological or partisan identifications.

Third, studies of state and local education policy could help revive what was once a burgeoning literature on political socialization. Thist prior work tended to find that families, not schools, were the most powerful force influencing children's beliefs about politics. But much has changed since then in family structures, how schools operate, the programs schools offer, and the students they serve. Schools are also more diverse places now than they were during the heyday of political socialization research. Do different institutional forms socialize students differently? Can state or local policy choices about curricular content influence subsequent political behavior or attitudes? Some critics have claimed that the current focus on accountability for reading and math instruction has caused schools to short-change history and citizenship studies. All of these factors have potential implications for how youth are socialized into the political system and, ultimately, for the health of American democracy.

Fourth, scholars of state and local education policy should consider engaging in more comparative work. One approach would be to compare education with other policy areas to identify more general propositions about behaviors and practices. In this spirit, prior research from Jacoby and Schneider (2001) has helped to situate education among a variety of other issues facing state policy makers, as Marschall and Ruhil's (2007) work has done in local settings. Seeing how education compares to other policy areas, as well as understanding how it interacts with them as states and localities develop their policy agendas, merits additional attention (Rigby, 2007). Comparing state and local education policy cross-nationally is another approach. One especially promising line of inquiry, as Wallner's (2010) work illustrates, would be to consider the emergence of federal and state policies promoting standards and accountability. Such policies have become more ubiquitous in the United States and abroad. Comparative work could help to reveal general insights about subnational institutions, performance, and the practice of accountability.

Fifth, more collaborative and systematic data collection efforts among scholars of state and local education policy could benefit the broader research community by sparking additional work in the diverse areas this chapter discusses. As scholars of state and local policy frequently note (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010), there are immense research challenges in education and other substantive areas, given the difficulty of developing comparable and complete data sets across subnational units and time. Local

school board elections, for example, are particularly difficult to study, given that they require on-the-ground work to track campaign behavior and gather election returns, which typically are not maintained by public authorities in comprehensive or relatively easy-to-access data sets. Fortunately, a new collaboration of scholars, the recently formed Local Elections in America Project, is beginning to address these issues systematically (Marschall, Shah, and Ruhil 2011).

Other future research opportunities will emerge, given that education likely will remain high on state and local government agendas. That continuing presence means that researchers will have many opportunities to secure funding and contribute to relevant policy discussions. As the studies surveyed in this chapter illustrate, participating in such practical discussions need not undermine one's scholarly productivity. An overall virtue of studying subnational education policy is that researchers can help enrich popular debates while simultaneously advancing theoretical understandings of politics that appeal to political scientists and public administration scholars working across numerous subfields. Such work has the potential to bring out the best in what scholars can offer, both within and beyond the walls of academia.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to Donald Haider-Markel, Jeffrey Henig, Andrew Karch, and Arnold Shober for providing superb feedback on earlier drafts.
2. Although researchers across the social sciences have studied subnational education policy and politics, this chapter delimits the discussion by focusing on work from political scientists and public administration scholars.
3. Witte's (2000) work on Milwaukee, which includes quantitative analyses and school case-studies, is an exception to the norm.
4. Research on educational markets, discussed in the previous section, is a subset of this larger area.
5. Although, this research program on Texas school districts and public management is one of the most notable and productive, other work has contributed to this discussion. Two recent books highlight the value of focusing on the actions of teachers and principals, classic examples of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). The first is Abernathy's (2007) work on the No Child Left Behind Act, which includes analysis of school principals' behavior during implementation. The second is Berkman and Plutzer's (2010) work on the teaching of evolution in the public schools.

REFERENCES

- Abernathy, Scott F. 2007. *No Child Left Behind and the Public Schools*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Berkman, Michael B. and Eric Plutzer. 2005. *Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and Public Opinion in America's School Districts*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Berkman, Michael and Eric Plutzer. 2010. *Evolution, Creationism, and the Battle to Control America's Classrooms*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Berry, Christopher R. and Martin R. West. 2010. "The School Consolidation Movement and Student Outcomes." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 26 (1): 1-29.
- Campbell, Roald F. and Tim L. Mazzoni Jr. 1976. *State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Making for the Public Schools in Twelve States and a Treatment of State Governance Models*. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation.
- Chubb, John E. 1985a. "Excessive Regulation: The Case of Federal Aid to Education." *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (2): 287-311.
- Chubb, John E. 1985b. "The Political Economy of Federalism." *American Political Science Review* 79 (4): 994-1015.
- Chubb, John E. and Terry M. Moe. 1988. "Politics, Markets, and the Organization of Schools." *American Political Science Review* 82 (4): 1065-1087.
- Chubb, John E. and Terry M. Moe. 1990. *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Fraga, Luis Ricardo, Kenneth J. Meier, and Robert E. England. 1986. "Hispanic Americans and Educational Policy: Limits to Equal Access." *Journal of Politics* 48(4): 850-876.
- Gormley, William T. and Deborah Phillips. 2005. "The Effects of Universal Pre-K in Oklahoma: Research Highlights and Policy Implications." *Policy Studies Journal* 33 (1): 65-82.
- Henig, Jeffrey R. 1994. *Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Henig, Jeffrey R. 2008. *Spin Cycle: How Research is Used in Policy Debates, the Case of Charter Schools*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation/Century Foundation.
- Henig, Jeffrey R. 2009. "Mayors, Governors, and Presidents: The New Education Executives and the Rise of Educational Exceptionalism." *Peabody Journal of Education* 84 (3): 283-299.
- Henig, Jeffrey R. and Wilbur C. Rich (eds). 2004. *Mayors in the Middle: Politics, Race, and Mayoral Control of Urban Schools*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Henig, Jeffrey R., Richard C. Hula, Marion Orr, and Desiree S. Pedescleaux. 1999. *The Color of School Reform: Race, Politics, and the Challenge of Urban Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hess, Frederick M. 1999. *Spinning Wheels: The Politics of Urban School Reform*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hess, Frederick M. 2002. *Revolution at the Margins: The Impact of Competition on Urban School Systems*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hicklin, Alisa and Kenneth J. Meier. 2008. "Race, Structure, and State Governments: The Politics of Higher Education Diversity." *Journal of Politics* 70 (3): 851-860.
- Howell, William G. 2004. "Dynamic Selection Effects in Means-tested, Urban School Voucher Programs." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23 (2): 225-250.
- Howell, William G. 2005. *Besieged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Howell, William G. and Paul E. Peterson. 2002. *The Education Gap: Vouchers and Urban Schools*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Jacoby, William G. and Sandra K. Schneider. 2001. "Variability in State Policy Priorities: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Politics* 62 (2): 544-568.
- Karch, Andrew. 2010. "Policy Feedback and Preschool Funding in the American States." *Policy Studies Journal* 38 (2): 217-234.
- Knott, Jack H. and A. Abigail Payne. 2004. "The Impact of State Governance Structures on Management and Performance of Public Organizations: A Study of Higher Education Institutions." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23 (1): 13-30.

- Leal, David L., Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. "The Politics of Latino Education: The Biases of At-large Elections." *Journal of Politics* 66 (4): 1224-1244.
- Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lowry, Robert C. 2001. "Governmental Structure, Trustee Selection, and Public University Prices and Spending: Multiple Means to Similar Ends." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 845-861.
- Lowry, Robert C. 2009. "Reauthorization of the Federal Higher Education Act and Accountability for Student Learning: The Dog that Didn't Bark." *Publius* 39 (3): 506-526.
- Manna, Paul F. 2002. "The Signals Parents Send When they Choose their Children's Schools." *Educational Policy* 16 (3): 425-447.
- Manna, Paul. 2006a. "Control, Persuasion and Educational Accountability: Implementing the No Child Left Behind Act." *Educational Policy* 20 (3): 471-494.
- Manna, Paul. 2006b. *School's In: Federalism and the National Education Agenda*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Manna, Paul. 2010. *Collision Course: Federal Education Policy Meets State and Local Realities*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Marschall, Melissa J. and Anirudh V. S. Ruhil. 2007. "The Attitudinal Dimension of Black Political Incorporation in Local Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 17-33.
- Marschall, Melissa J., Anirudh V. S. Ruhil, and Paru R. Shah. 2010. "The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 107-124.
- Marschall, Melissa J., Paru Shah, and Anirudh Ruhil. 2011. "Symposium on the Study of Local Elections." *Editors' Introduction: A Looking Glass into the Future. PS: Political Science and Politics* 44 (1): 97-100.
- Masters, Nicholas A., Robert H. Salisbury, and Thomas H. Eliot. 1964. *State Politics and the Public Schools: An Exploratory Analysis*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- McDermott, Kathryn A. 2003. "What Causes Variation in States' Accountability Policies?" *Peabody Journal of Education* 78 (4): 153-176.
- McDermott, Kathryn A. and Laura S. Jensen. 2005. "Dubious Sovereignty: Federal Conditions of Aid and the No Child Left Behind Act." *Peabody Journal of Education* 80 (2): 39-56.
- McDonnell, Lorraine M. 2005. "No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?" *Peabody Journal of Education* 80 (2): 19-38.
- McGuinn, Patrick. 2005. "The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New Educational Federalism." *Publius* 35 (1): 41-68.
- McGuinn, Patrick J. 2006. *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965-2005*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Meier, Kenneth J. 1984. "Teachers, Students, and Discrimination: The Policy Impact of Black Representation." *Journal of Politics* 46 (1): 252-263.
- Meier, Kenneth J. 2004. "Structure, Politics, and Policy: The Logic of Mayoral Control." In Jeffrey R. Henig and Wilbur C. Rich (eds), *Mayors in the Middle: Politics, Race, and Mayoral Control of Urban Schools*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 221-231.
- Meier, Kenneth J. 2009. "Policy Theory, Policy Theory Everywhere: Ravings of a Deranged Policy Scholar." *Policy Studies Journal* 37 (1): 5-11.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Robert E. England. 1984. "Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?" *American Political Science Review* 78 (2): 392-403.

- Meier, Kenneth J. and Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. 2001. "Managerial Strategies and Behavior in Networks: A Model with Evidence from U.S. Public Education." *Journal of Public Administration, Research, and Theory* 11 (3): 271-293.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. 2003. "Public Management and Educational Performance: The Impact of Managerial Networking." *Public Administration Review* 63 (6): 689-699.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. 2004. "Parkinson's Law and the New Public Management? Contracting Determinants and Service-Quality Consequences in Public Education." *Public Administration Review* 64 (3): 342-352.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Laurence J. O'Toole Jr. 2006. "Political Control Versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate." *Public Administration Review* 66 (2): 177-192.
- Meier, Kenneth J. and Joseph Stewart Jr. 1991. "Cooperation and Conflict in Multiracial School Districts." *Journal of Politics* 53 (4): 1123-1133.
- Meier, Kenneth J., J. L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. 2000. "Bureaucracy and Organizational Performance: Causality Arguments about Public Schools." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 590-602.
- Meier, Kenneth J., Laurence J. O'Toole Jr, and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. 2004. "Multilevel Governance and Organizational Performance: Investigating the Political-Bureaucratic Labyrinth." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23 (1): 31-48.
- Meier, Kenneth J., Eric Gonzalez Juenke, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J. L. Polinard. 2005. "Structural Choices and Representational Biases: The Post-election Color of Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 758-768.
- Mintrom, Michael. 1997a. "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 738-770.
- Mintrom, Michael. 1997b. "The State-Local Nexus in Policy Innovation Diffusion: The Case of School Choice." *Publius* 27 (3): 41-59.
- Mintrom, Michael. 2000. *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Mintrom, Michael and Sandra Vergari. 1998. "Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education Reforms." *Journal of Politics* 60 (1): 126-148.
- Moe, Terry M. 2006. "Political Control and the Power of the Agent." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 22 (1): 1-29.
- Moe, Terry M. 2009. "Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (1): 156-174.
- Nicholson-Crotty, Jill and Kenneth J. Meier. 2003. "Politics, Structure, and Public Policy: The Case of Higher Education." *Educational Policy* 17 (1): 80-97.
- O'Toole, Laurence J., Jr and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. "Desperately Seeking Selznik: Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks." *Public Administration Review* 64 (6): 681-693.
- Rigby, Elizabeth. 2007. "Same Policy Area, Different Politics: How Characteristics of Policy Tools Alter the Determinants of Early Childhood Education Policy." *Policy Studies Journal* 35 (4): 653-669.
- Rocha, Rene R. 2007. "Black-Brown Coalitions in Local School Board Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 60 (2): 315-327.
- Schneider, Mark and Jack Buckley. 2007. *Charter Schools: Hope or Hype?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, Michael Mintrom, and Christine Roch. 1997a. "Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 82-93.
- Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Christine Roch, and Melissa Marschall. 1997b. "Networks to Nowhere: Segregation and Stratification in Networks of Information About Schools." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 1201-1223.
- Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Melissa Marshall, and Christine Roch. 1998. "Shopping for Schools: In the Land of the Blind, the One-eyed Parent May Be Enough." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (3): 769-793.
- Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, and Melissa Marschall. 2000. *Choosing Schools: Consumer Choice and the Quality of American Schools*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Shober, Arnold F. 2010. *Splintered Accountability: State Governance and Education Reform*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Shober, Arnold F., Paul Manna, and John F. Witte. 2006. "Flexibility Meets Accountability: State Charter School Laws and their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States." *Policy Studies Journal* 34 (4): 563-587.
- Smith, Kevin B. and Kenneth J. Meier. 1994. "Politics, Bureaucrats, and Schools." *Public Administration Review* 54 (4): 551-558.
- Smith, Kevin B. and Kenneth J. Meier. 1995. *The Case Against School Choice: Politics, Markets, and Fools*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Stewart, Joseph, Jr, Robert E. England, and Kenneth J. Meier. 1989. "Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom." *Western Political Quarterly* 42 (2): 287-305.
- Teske, Paul, Mark Schneider, Michael Mintrom, and Samuel Best. 1993. "Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 702-713.
- Teske, Paul, Mark Schneider, Jack Buckley, and Sarah Clark. 2001. Can Charter Schools Change Traditional Public Schools?" In Paul E. Peterson and David E. Campbell (eds), *Charters, Vouchers, and Public Education*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Wallner, Jennifer. 2010. "Beyond National Standards: Reconciling Tension Between Federalism and the Welfare State." *Publius* 40 (4): 646-671.
- Wirt, Frederick M. and Michael W. Kirst. 2009. *The Political Dynamics of American Education*, 4th edition. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation.
- Witte, John F. 1998. "The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 20 (4): 229-251.
- Witte, John F. 2000. *The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First Voucher Program*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Witte, John F., Paul Schlomer, and Arnold F. Shober. 2007. "Going Charter? A Study of School District Competition in Wisconsin." *Peabody Journal of Education* 82 (2): 410-439.
- Wolf, Patrick J. 2005. "School Choice and Civic Values." In Julian Betts and Tom Loveless (eds), *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Wong, Kenneth K. and Francis X. Shen. 2002. "Politics of State-led Reform in Education: Market Competition and Electoral Dynamics." *Educational Policy* 16 (1): 161-192.
- Wong, Kenneth and Gail Sunderman. 2007. "Education Accountability as a Presidential Priority: No Child Left Behind and the Bush Presidency." *Publius* 37 (3): 333-350.
- Wong, Kenneth K., Francis X. Shen, Dorothea Anagnostopoulos, and Stacey Rutledge. 2007. *The Education Mayor: Improving America's Schools*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.