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Understanding the social origins and political career pathways of a country's political elite is of paramount importance if one is to fully understand the country's political system. Roderic Camp expertly combines his tremendous grasp of Mexican political history with an impressive set of diverse data on the Mexican political elite to provide a landmark study of political leadership in this extremely important country. This is without question a book which every Mexicanist should read. It also represents a valuable resource for U.S. politicians and policymakers, who would benefit greatly from having a better understanding of their Mexican counterparts, as well as for scholars of former and current dominant party systems for whom the book provides a model for studies of these systems.

Mark P. Jones
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Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer. *Evolution, Creationism, and the Battle to Control America's Classrooms.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. xii, 287 pp. (\$85.00 cloth, \$27.99 paper).

Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer's book on the teaching of evolution and creationism in the United States is an excellent example of political science research at its best. The authors offer rigorous empirical analyses grounded in clear theories while revealing important insights about an enduring political controversy. The book's research design and organization allow the authors to address two broad questions (p. 4): "How is education policy made in each of the fifty states? How is policy actually implemented in each of the thousands of individual classrooms across the nation?"

Although Berkman and Plutzer focus specifically on the evolution controversy and education policy, their study speaks to much broader issues about where ideas come from, how they make their way into policy, and what happens during implementation at the ground level. Understanding the forces that influence what students learn in science classrooms requires much more than studying just broad public preferences or the content of education policy or the beliefs and behaviors of teachers. Rather, Berkman and Plutzer show why one must attend to all of these issues simultaneously while paying special attention to choices made at the classroom level. As they explain in their concluding chapter (p. 227), "Whether the official curriculum reflects majority wishes or the ideals of the scientific community, control of the nation's classrooms will depend on the training, values, and constraints placed on the nation's biology teachers—they will remain the central figures in the battle to control America's classrooms."

The authors reach that primary conclusion by walking the reader through a series of logical empirical steps, beginning with a bird's eye view of the evolution controversy and ending in the public schools where America's biology teachers design their lessons and teach their students. An introductory chapter describes how debates about evolution have changed over time. Those changes have produced important judicial decisions that have "narrowed the policy space" (p. 24) in ways that have favored teaching scientific perspectives on evolution rather than religious perspectives that favor creationism. In the second and third chapters the authors perform their own secondary analysis of several public opinion surveys in light of these prior court decisions. They find that the public generally prefers more balance between the teaching of evolution and creationism than courts seem to have allowed. The authors use this analysis in the opening chapters to help readers reflect on the tensions between majoritarian and anti-majoritarian institutions of governance.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters bridge the various gaps, often present in other studies, between public preferences, state policy, and classroom teaching. Here Berkman and Plutzer draw on theoretical concepts from the literatures on political behavior, subnational policymaking, and bureaucracy. They present evidence from their own original empirical work, which includes coding of state science standards and a survey of the nation's high school biology teachers. Readers learn many things in these chapters including the factors that influence the development of science and evolution standards by state policymakers. They also discover the extent to which those standards affect how teachers teach evolution in biology classrooms. Importantly, the authors find that standards have minimal influence on teachers' classroom behaviors; they appear to have their greatest impact on "younger teachers who lack self-confidence in their understanding of evolution" (p. 170).

If standards do not shape the teaching of evolution then what does? The authors probe that question in chapters seven and eight where they use their biology teacher survey to examine how teachers' personal beliefs and the characteristics of the communities in which teachers live might be relevant. Berkman and Plutzer draw on prior work on street-level bureaucracy and how bureaucracies serve representative functions to help them reach two key conclusions. First, teachers' beliefs and prior training appear to play major roles in how they address evolution and creationism in their classrooms. Second, the authors find evidence of "bottom up democratic control" (p. 213) of the bureaucracy given that teacher characteristics and practices tend to reflect the preferences of their local communities. The book's ninth chapter concludes by recapping the main findings and offering some predictions about how the evolution versus creationism debate may unfold in

the future. Finally, five methodological appendices provide technical details on the empirical work that appears in chapters two through six.

In all, Berkman and Plutzer's work is an inviting read for scholars and students with broad interests in how the American political system addresses enduring political controversies. Readers will not find new theoretical insights in the book but rather a marshalling of relevant and useful theoretical perspectives that guide the empirical analysis and help the authors to draw out important implications. Based on its substantive focus and connections to broad themes in political science the book would be a great supplement for introductory or advanced courses on American politics, public policy, or public administration, especially. It would be equally valuable for courses on research methods given the range of evidence that the authors use—survey data that others collected, original coding of state policies, execution of an original survey containing closed- and open-ended questions—and the care with which they draw inferences from their data. Perhaps one of the book's greatest strengths is its ability to show readers how researchers can engage in heated political debates while remaining true to the evidence before them. In an area as charged as the teaching of evolution and creationism, what the book's title reminds us is literally a "battle to control America's classrooms," that is no small accomplishment.

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David M. O'Brien. *Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the U.S. Supreme Court.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. 136 pp. (\$29.95 cloth).

In *Congress Shall Make No Law* David O'Brien, the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor at the University of Virginia, provides a handy and insightful, if limited, précis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence covering the free speech and press protections of the First Amendment. As O'Brien's subtitle suggests, the focus of *Congress Shall Make No Law* is unprotected expression. O'Brien emphasizes at the outset that the language of the First Amendment is unequivocal: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Yet despite this categorical language both Congress and states have sought to impose restrictions on speech and the press. As a result a number of exceptions to First Amendment protection have emerged in Supreme Court jurisprudence. O'Brien focuses on four of these exceptions: obscenity, defamation, commercial speech, and "fighting words."

Originally, there was a significant dispute about what precisely the First Amendment protected. Did it only provide against "prior restraints," those prohibitions on publications before they are published, or did it also protect against punishments that might be imposed after something is said or published? It was not until the twentieth century that clarity with respect to these questions began to emerge. This was a consequence of the Supreme Court applying the First Amendment to the states through the vehicle of the Fourteenth Amendment, once again ignoring the plain text of the amendment, which applied only to Congress. These innovations in First Amendment law took place in the 1920s and 1930s. Accordingly, it would be in the twentieth century that the most fundamental questions concerning the purposes of freedom of expression would be addressed.

What those purposes are are not discussed in great detail in O'Brien's book since his focus is on Supreme Court jurisprudence, but their contours become evident in the survey of Court opinions O'Brien provides. He demonstrates how once the Court entered the fray of policing state and federal restrictions on speech it encountered difficulties coming up with tests that adequately accounted for the various interests at play in the constitutional disputes. The bad tendency and clear and present danger tests were in vogue for a short period of time. Then a more explicit balancing approach was adopted. Later, in 1968, Justice Hugo Black famously proposed in a speech his absolutist approach to the First Amendment, one that prohibited *all* governmental restrictions on speech or the press. Although the Court has never adopted such a categorical position with respect to free speech under the Constitution, O'Brien highlights how messy things get, doctrinally and legally, once the Court starts making distinctions between the categories of speech that will or will not be protected.

What is the difference, for instance, between obscene and non-obscene communications? Can the Court intelligibly distinguish between nudity in "high art," such as that in movies or operas, and "low art," such as that in strip clubs? In the law of defamation, who is a public official or public figure who must therefore prove "actual malice"—reckless disregard for the truth—in libel actions, and who is a private individual subject to a lower standard of proof in such cases? Is the distinction between private and public figures the Court has established sound? Commercial speech or the advertising of goods and services became an unprotected category of speech in the mid-twentieth century. Why the Court chose to leave commercial speech unprotected has never been fully answered but in the latter decades of the twentieth century the Court began to afford it greater protection.

O'Brien concludes that "The First Amendment is not absolute, nor could (or should) it be." There are various communications Congress regulates, such as false advertising, fraud, and perjury, which it must punish.