

The Politics of Education Policy in the American Federal System

Paul Manna
Ph.D. candidate

110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, WI 53706

pmanna@polisci.wisc.edu
<www.polisci.wisc.edu/~pmanna>

ABSTRACT: After studying revisions to the United States tariff of 1929-1930, E. E. Schattschneider opined that "New policies create new politics." This paper describes how Schattschneider's pithy insight nicely captures developments in American education during the last four decades. The paper's three sections describe important political dynamics that have emerged from the expanding and increasingly intertwined K-12 education agendas of policymakers in Washington, DC and the nation's fifty states. The first section describes how the federal education agenda and federal-state interactions have influenced institutional politics in the states. The second focuses on how increasing federal interest and involvement in education have prompted and, in turn, reacted to changes in the national interest group community. The final section explores how presidents have been able to assert an increasingly influential role in education despite a tradition of congressional dominance in this policy area. The data sources are diverse, and include over 60 elite interviews with members of the education policy community in Washington, DC.

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 3-5, 2003. Thanks to John Witte, Don Kettl, John Coleman, Patty Strach, Travis Ridout, and members of the Research Seminar on Voting and Politics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Special thanks are due to my interview respondents who, without exception, offered their time both generously and enthusiastically. For financial support I thank the Graduate School and Graduate Student Council at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Dirksen Congressional Center, and Jeff Henig and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University.

In previous work, I have described how dynamic interactions between federal and state policymakers have expanded the federal education agenda since 1965, the year that the first Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) became law (Manna 2001; Manna 2002b). Federal officials have demonstrated increasing interest and involvement in the nation's schools even though Uncle Sam remains a marginal player in K-12 education finance in the United States. As Figure 1 shows, this relatively small contribution has remained essentially constant during the last four decades.

Figure 1 here

Despite that financial limitation, federal officials—elected, appointed, and career—have been able to expand their education agendas by simultaneously charting new paths and seeking leverage from education reform initiatives underway in the states. The process of actors at one level of government expanding their agendas by leveraging capabilities and arguments from another level is something that I call "borrowing strength" (Manna 2002b, pp. 6-7). Through this process federal policymakers have increased their symbolic and substantive reach into the nation's classrooms. At the same time, however, states have not been passive agents who simply react to the whims of federal principals. State officials have used the burgeoning federal role in the nation's schools to borrow strength as well, frequently leveraging federal interest and involvement in education to help achieve their own goals. In short, by borrowing strength, officials in Washington, DC and state capitals have engaged in a sort of strategic dance designed to leverage one another to push their respective agendas.

This interactive process has had significant implications for the content and shape of education policy in the United States. During the last decade, in particular, and owing to the acceleration of the state standards movement and federal efforts to support and extend it in the 1990s, the latest version of the ESEA, known as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, now reaches farther and deeper into the core functions of the nation's schools than ever before. For example, building on state accountability and testing systems, federal law now requires states to test students in reading and math in grades 3 through 8 beginning in the 2005-06 school year. The law also directs schools deemed as consistently low performers to allow parents to choose to send their children to another public school. Finally, the law also requires that schools employ only highly qualified teachers in core academic subjects.

Federal-state interactions have not only produced new federal policy. The growing federal education agenda has also affected the nation's politics, both at the state and national levels. This is not surprising, perhaps, and essentially restates one of political scientist E. E. Schattschneider's great insights: "New policies create new politics." While Schattschneider reached this conclusion after studying revisions to the United States tariff of 1929-1930, he suggested rhetorically that, "Is this not true, in varying degrees, of nearly all other policies also?" (Schattschneider 1935, p. 288).

In the realm of American education policy, at least, the answer to Schattschneider's question is clearly yes. This paper focuses on three of the most consequential political dynamics that have emerged. The paper's first section describes how the developing federal education

agenda has influenced institutional politics in the states, specifically, the political relationships between governors, state legislatures, and state education departments. The second focuses on how growing federal interest and involvement in education have prompted and reacted to changes in the national interest group community, especially business groups, which have become key intermediaries between federal and state officials. The final section explores how recent presidents have asserted an increasingly influential role in education despite a tradition of congressional dominance in this policy area. Across all three sections I draw on a diverse collection of evidence, including over 60 elite interviews (described in the Appendix) with members of the national education policy community conducted between April 2001 and May 2002.

Overall, the paper reveals that the expanding federal education agenda and the interactive relationships between state and federal officials have created a new, high stakes, education politics in the United States. These changes have been perhaps most significant for federal officials who today are forced to consider education along side more traditionally national issues such as health care, Social Security, taxes, and even national defense.

Federal education agendas and institutional politics in the states

As federal and state education agendas have expanded and become more interrelated during the last four decades, policy choices in Washington have influenced the climate and substance of state education politics. Rather than simply the product of state responses to federal commands, as principal-agent approaches would suggest (Chubb 1985a; Chubb 1985b; Hill 2000), these state-level politics have developed as state actors have cooperated and tussled with one another and attempted to leverage federal officials to further their own agendas. In the process, these dynamics have revealed American federalism's "highly protean form" (Derthick 2001, p. 153).

Picking winners

Since 1965, federal money to support K-12 education has consistently flowed to states via their education departments. This pattern has persisted unabated during the nearly four decade lifespan of the ESEA.

A consequence of these funding streams has been to limit significantly the range of state actors who cross paths with federal education officials. As Gerald Tirozzi told me, "When I was assistant secretary [for elementary and secondary education] in the Clinton administration we worked almost exclusively with the state chiefs." Alex Medler, acting head of the education department's charter schools office agreed. He noted, "Up here we lobby Congress all of the time; we've got 50 people who do that. But there's this view that we shouldn't lobby the states. ... The view up here is that the Department of Education shouldn't be lobbying legislatures directly on these kinds of things [charter school grants]." Leaders in the federal education department "want us to communicate to the state departments," he said, "and then they [state education department officials] communicate to the legislatures, and then the laws can get changed."

The flow of federal aid and these lines of communication between federal and state education officials have fostered state bureaucratic structures that parallel federal priorities. As two of my respondents noted, by and large state education departments are organized to "mimic the federal structure" and produce "state clones of federal policy that [have] affected the way state programs were formulated."¹ Other respondents (and published authors) frequently used the term "silos" both to describe these patterns of state education administration and to emphasize that federal money tends to flow into separate program-oriented bins (ESEA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [IDEA], for example), which discourage state administrators from integrating the various activities that they oversee.

Remarkably, despite the important influences that federal programs have had on the organization of state education bureaucracies, it was not until the early 1990s that a comprehensive study addressed this topic. The analysis appeared in 1994 when, at the request of Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) assessed "(1) the amount of federal dollars used by state education agencies (SEAs) to fund their administrative and other operating costs and (2) how SEAs are using these funds to support their operating activities" (General Accounting Office 1994, p. 1).

Using data from fiscal year 1993, the GAO's overall findings supported the basic claim that on average federal funding has important organizational and personnel impacts on state education departments. The GAO cautioned, however, that drawing broad generalizations based only on national averages did obscure significant variation among the states. For example, across all states roughly 41 percent of state education department operating funds derived from federal sources; but individual state-level totals ranged from 6 percent in Maine to 77 percent in Michigan. Similarly, in terms of personnel, the GAO reported that on average the salaries of 41 percent of employees in state departments came from federal dollars; but again, across the states the numbers ranged from 10 percent in Connecticut to 81 percent in Iowa (General Accounting Office 1994, pp. 5 and 14). Figure 2 relates these two measures and reveals visually some of the variation that the GAO described.²

Figure 2 here

Despite the careful caveats that pepper the GAO's report, it is clear that federal dollars assert an important—in some cases hugely important—influence on the policies and regulations that many state education agencies produce. (Notice, for example, that 20 states score above 40 percent on both measures in Figure 2.) And as my interviews made clear, the folk wisdom that state education departments are essentially creatures of the federal government animates the

¹ These two quotes are from interviews with Jack Jennings and Kati Haycock, respectively.

² The GAO identified two primary reasons for much of this state variation. First, not all state education departments operate the same mix of federal programs either because either the state does not participate in the program at all or because another state administrative agency handles the program. Second, a single high-dollar program can skew overall spending and staffing patterns. Michigan is a prototypical case. As the GAO authors explained, "Michigan's SEA operates three federal programs not common to most SEAs—Vocational Rehabilitation, Disability Determination Service, and Student Loans. ... If these three federal programs are subtracted from the operating funding, the federal share of Michigan's SEA operating funding is reduced [from 77 percent] to about 33 percent" (General Accounting Office 1994, p. 8).

thinking of several public officials and opinion leaders in the Washington education policy community. These patterns of state organization, and the federal dollars that support them, have produced unintended political consequences in states that have become increasingly important as federal and state education agendas have expanded.

Political machinations in the states

Across the United States, four primary agents typically have some direct responsibility for state education policy: the state education department, which is normally headed by the chief state school officer or state superintendent; the state legislature; the governor; and the state board. State similarities typically end there, however. One of my veteran interview respondents made this point quite nicely when she noted, "One of the huge trends or controversies going back even before and back to the original ESEA was how to answer the question: 'Who is the state?' If you look at state constitutions and statutes you see lots of variation in how education is handled."

In some states, for example, the governor appoints members of the state board of education and perhaps even the state's chief school officer. In other states the chief is an elected official who appears on the ballot alongside candidates for other offices, such as governor and attorney general. Still other states involve a set of decisionmakers—the governor, state legislature, and state education chief, perhaps—to choose board members. Frequently the terms of these appointed officials do not perfectly overlap the terms of governors and state legislators.

By channeling federal dollars and much of federal-to-state communication through state education departments, federal education policy has essentially organized its efforts around one component of the states' governing apparatus. David Shreve with the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) characterized the federal strategy this way: "By sending its money to the SEA, the federal government has picked a winner and a loser, and for good or ill, has altered the dynamic balance of the governance structure." He continued and described to me the blind spot that this federal approach reveals. "The problem," he said, "is that when the feds see education they see a monolithic system and are oblivious to the great diversity in governance structures. That comes through in ESEA and IDEA. They see that system and they think that they need to give all of their money to the chiefs; they send it all to them."

Certainly it is not difficult to craft a reasonable argument to justify the general federal strategy of engaging the states primarily through their education departments. The administrative divisions of labor within states, and the implementation and leadership functions that state departments are theoretically designed to handle make them, at first glance at least, obvious recipients for federal funds and attention (Kaagan and Usdan 1993). And for roughly a decade or so after the first ESEA became law, the relatively low profile that education had in state legislatures and governors' offices created incentives for federal policymakers to rely heavily on state departments as conduits for federal efforts.

When education policy's political stature began to increase in the states—beginning in the mid- to late-1970s and accelerating rapidly in the 1980s—governors and legislators recognized the political challenges they faced in attempting to implement their own educational visions. Initially, at least, they found themselves outmatched by their very own state education

departments, which possessed valuable data and, in many states, much fiscal autonomy on account of their close ties to federal programs and funding. This institutional mismatch, which federal funding streams fostered, has created two broad and enduring political consequences.

First, by channeling resources through state education departments, federal involvement has stoked political resentments and mistrust between state leaders. In particular, the institutional independence that federal resources allow education departments to maintain can frustrate state legislators and governors as they have become more active in education policymaking.

While noting that the federal government sometimes has legitimate rationales to channel program dollars through state education agencies, Shreve emphasized to me the potential negative consequences this choice has on state-level education debates.³ "I can tell you," he said, "that I've sat in hearings at the state level and heard testimony from education agency employees who respond to a [state] senator's question by saying 'I don't have to answer that because it's federal money you're talking about.' If there's one thing that a state legislator hates to hear it's something like that."

At the same time, state school chiefs, who typically do not command the public profile and media spotlight that governors or state legislators do, can feel similar resentments. They sometimes perceive other elected officials' self-promotion strategies as cheap political grabs designed to shore up educational bona fides with voters, even while these same officials pay little attention to the mundane, but critically important, details of program design and implementation that agencies are charged with addressing (Kaagan and Usdan 1993). Again, Tirozzi, a former head of the Connecticut state education department before joining the Clinton administration, told me that often, and in his own specific case, governors and state school chiefs do get along well; but given the diversity in state education governance this does not always happen. Some governors, he noted "do one thing like pass a law for testing and they say that they're the education governor."

David Griffith of the National Association of State Boards of Education characterized a similar dynamic that sometimes plays out between governors and state boards. He explained, "There is always talk about abolishing state boards; governors use the rhetoric that they'll take over and the buck will stop here. But governors also like to have the boards as a punching bag. They can distance themselves from failure, but still take credit for success."

A second major political consequence of the expanded federal education agenda has been to create incentives for state officials to use federal interest and involvement in education to help them achieve political success battles amongst themselves. As a result, when state actors position their organizations to claim credit for successes and deflect blame for failures, citizens and federal officials can find it increasingly difficult to hold states accountable for educational results. That difficulty has intensified since 1994 when federal involvement began to focus more on accountability.

³ Jack Jennings and Chester Finn also raised this issue of inter-institutional trust in my interviews with them.

The defensive and sometimes buck-passing tendencies that state actors develop can manifest themselves in many ways. The results frequently reveal how these individuals, in appealing to federal officials to help them prosecute their own state-level political battles, can produce deeper federal interest and involvement in education. Three brief examples will illustrate

The first example comes from the early 1980s. Shortly after U.S. Secretary of Education Terrell Bell's National Commission on Excellence in Education published its notable report, *A Nation at Risk*, the governors were holding their annual meeting not far from where Vice President George H. W. Bush was vacationing at his Maine home. Bush and Bell used the serendipity of those two events to host an informal meeting with the governors in Kennebunkport.

The governors aired several complaints at this meeting and pressed for a national rating system of state education performance. In his memoirs, Bell recalled the governors' frustration with state education departments that prompted this request.

[The governors] said they had no information that told them where their states stood educationally in comparison to others. Lacking this, they were defenseless when their state superintendents and commissions of education insisted that students in *their* state were above the national average in academic achievement. If you believed these top-level state school officers, just about every state in the country was above the national average! Though many of the seriously concerned governors knew this was far from true, there was little they could do without data to support their efforts for change (Bell 1988, p. 136).

Bell responded and had his department produce what became known as the Wall Chart, a regular compilation of several indicators that compared states' educational performance. After having resisted this sort of state-by-state comparison for years, the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) soon reversed course and "approved a plan to conduct regular comparisons of the educational performance of the states rather than permit the federal government to preempt interstate performance comparisons" (Jung and Kirst 1986, pp. 97-8).

The second example centers on events from 1989 to 1994, during and after the national education summit at Charlottesville, Virginia between President Bush and the nation's governors. Going into the summit in 1989, part of the governors' political strategy was to mold the event's agenda to help fortify and extend their influence over education policymaking at both the state and the federal levels. It is telling that the National Education Goals Panel (NEGP), the major institution to emerge from the summit's work, contained governors and federal officials, but no members from state education departments or state legislatures. Only in 1994, when federal law codified the NEGP, did state legislators join its ranks. Even then the governors outnumbered them two to one, still controlled the panel's chair, and state education chiefs remained unrepresented, even though federal education policy continued to flow through the departments in their charge (Vinovskis 1999).

A third and more recent example illustrates how tensions between governors, legislators, and education department officials can provoke exchanges that play out in the federal legislative process. In 2001, this dynamic revealed itself during debate over the No Child Left Behind Act.

As part of its lobbying effort, the NCSL sent a letter to members of Congress that, among other things, raised concerns about education governance. In part, the letter argued:

ESEA remains the only major federal program in which a *sub-state agency* is specifically identified as the recipient of federal funds. Both pieces of legislation [House and Senate versions of the bill] directly endow state education agencies with unprecedented authority [that] ... in both the short and long terms, impact overall state policy and state budgets. ... Picking winners and losers in internal state affairs is not an appropriate role for the federal government (National Conference of State Legislatures 2001, my emphasis).

One experienced interview respondent called the NCSL's use of "sub-state agencies" a "gratuitous slap" against the state education chiefs and their organization, the CCSSO. In a related development, debates over the No Child Left Behind Act's funding streams also drew the CCSSO and the nation's governors into a battle over who should control federal dollars.⁴

Considering both of these unintended political consequences, many critics have berated what they see as the distorting tendencies that federal education policy creates (Hill 2000). While that criticism contains more than a grain of truth, federal involvement aside, state education departments still respond to many more state-level political pressures than is frequently acknowledged. In that environment, it can be especially challenging for agency leaders to act well when the governor, state legislature, and state board have conflicting policy and perhaps partisan preferences. Furthermore, feeling sometimes as though their legislative and gubernatorial partners have overlooked their potential contributions to educational improvement (and not provided dollars to support their efforts), leaders in state education departments have sometimes resisted or attempted to refocus policy changes that legislators and governors have proposed. In many states, with the federal government having provided a more reliable source of consistent funding, and bureaucratic commitments hardening as state education department staffs have become wedded to federal program commitments, it is no wonder that governors and state legislators have not always found state education departments willing or capable partners.⁵

Overall, then, blaming the self-preservation strategies of state and federal education bureaucrats for slowing reform while ignoring the historical tendencies of other state players mischaracterizes the political environment in which state education policy operates. Certainly, bureaucratic inertia has proved problematic for educational innovation. However, through a sort of benign neglect of their education bureaucracies since 1965, today's governors and state legislatures are essentially sleeping in the proverbial beds that they and their predecessors have made. They are at least partially responsible for the tough spots—strait jackets, they might say—that they sometimes find themselves in today.

Perhaps most critically, this long term indifference toward state education departments combined with the sometimes disproportionate influence that federal dollars have on those

⁴ An amendment to S. 1 (the Senate version of the ESEA reauthorization of 2001) from Senators Voinovich and Bayh proposed language that would have given governors more direct control over federal funds. The CCSSO and its allies pushed to keep the language more amenable to state departments. In the end, the Senate failed to adopt the amendment.

⁵ McDermott's (2002) case study of the implementation of the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 provides a detailed look at these political cross-pressures that state education departments can face.

organizations has become increasingly significant now that governors and other state officials have, in the words of one respondent, "gotten religion" about education. The current push toward greater accountability for student achievement and the presence of an even more activist federal government in education will only heighten the political stresses that America's multifaceted system of state educational governance creates.

Interest groups, idea makers, and education politics

Scholars have documented in great detail the general growth of organized interest groups in the American political system. Even though claims of an "interest-group explosion" are present in academic work at regular intervals across the 1900s (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, p. 102), the number of organized groups in several policy areas has increased at a significant rate in recent decades. Education is no exception. For example, in 1980, the *Encyclopedia of Associations* listed 976 such educational groups. By 1990 that number had grown to 1,292; and in 1995 it stood at 1,312 (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, p. 103). Those numbers do not include the many all-purpose organizations and think tanks that have expanded their education policy components during this time.

As in other fields, the growing number of education groups, especially those based in the Washington, DC area, has increased the volume and range of voices in this policy area. With the national political and policy stakes in education rising as Washington's education agenda has grown, these groups have expanded. New organizations with new ideas (or old ideas in new garb) have appeared. Some leaders at these new groups frequently disparage what they see as a self-serving educational establishment, known pejoratively as "The Blob" (a label that many Blob members wear with a snicker and bit of pride),⁶ which has somehow lost touch with the realities facing the nation's educators and other school leaders.

Many groups with long histories continue to remain active and influential in Washington's political circles, and sometimes even national electoral campaigns. These groups include the nation's major teacher unions (National Education Association [NEA] and American Federation of Teachers [AFT]), the CCSSO, the National Association of State Boards of Education, and several groups representing local interests, such as the National School Boards Association, the American Association of School Administrators, and other teacher and principal organizations. Their collective clout has waned, however, as new diverse groups across the political spectrum have found niches in the policy debate. One interview respondent described this shift by saying that Washington politicians now frequently "go out and get alternative groups and pull them in. They get a teacher who wrote them a letter complaining about the system. In general, they're running away from the establishment." Overall, education is like other policy areas in that the nearly impenetrable iron triangles of the past have become more diffuse and fluid policy networks (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Salisbury 1990).

Predictably, many newly influential groups in the Washington idea community have emerged as the individual or collective projects of veterans of national education debates and federal institutions. Examples of these groups (all founded or dramatically expanded in the

⁶ The Center for Education Reform, for example, maintains a "Blob Watch" on its web site: <<http://edreform.com/info/blob.htm>>. Accessed various dates, March 2003.

1990s) include the Center on Education Policy; the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation; the Education Leaders Council; the 21st Century Schools Project at the Progressive Policy Institute; the National Center on Education and the Economy; and the Education Trust. With education rising on the federal education agenda, these groups have found no shortage of elected officials, executive branch and congressional staff, and reporters interested in their published work and events.

Perhaps as important as all of these groups combined has been the national business community and its emerging influence in federal education debates. Since 1965, the transformation of business' interest in education has been remarkable and important. Frequently, business groups have offered a steadying and consistent background voice as state and federal leaders have attempted to borrow strength from one another to expand their agendas. Given the important political implications of the business community's growing role in national education politics, it is worth considering in some depth how this admittedly diverse group has become a strong supporter of federal education efforts and, in the process, rebuked many of its previous positions.

Despite a long history of interest and involvement in state and local education issues from the beginning of the 20th century through World War II, business leaders in the 1960s were first indifferent and then outright hostile to an increased federal presence in the nation's schools. During the first ESEA debate in 1965, for example, Theron J. Rice, Legislative Action Manager for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, sent to all members of the House of Representatives a short letter and accompanying 10-page memo describing why members should oppose the bill. Rice argued that the ESEA would pose an "unprecedented threat of federal domination and standardization of elementary and secondary education" (Chamber of Commerce of the United States 1965). This hostility contrasts sharply with the enthusiastic support that business leaders offered during debate over the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, easily a more prescriptive law than the first ESEA (Manna 2002a).

Business' opposition in 1965 and subsequent indifference to expanded federal education programs and efforts to curb school segregation in the 1970s derived from three main sources (Timpane and McNeill 1991, pp. 1-3).⁷ First was financial self-interest. Business leaders feared that an expanded federal role in education would produce higher taxes from federal, state, and local governments as policymakers responded to new mandates and initiatives. Second was the growing number of stakeholders involved in educational decisionmaking. Those additional players frustrated business interests that did not possess the political or policy knowledge in education to navigate such crowded waters. Business groups were typically risk averse in education policy and avoided entering highly charged political debates over educational issues involving race and desegregation. The third reason was that with a capable and plentiful domestic labor force and no significant international competition, by and large the captains of American industry felt no sense of urgency to help improve the quality of American schooling that the nation's young people received. Taken together, these three factors resulted in business

⁷ I also explored these reasons in interviews with Milton Goldberg, Buzz Bartlett, Christopher Cross, Chester Finn, Janet Hansen, Susan Traiman, Michael Usdan, and Kati Haycock.

leaders playing little or no role in debates over federal education policy for essentially a quarter century after the first ESEA became law.

Starting in the late 1970s, as governors and other state officials began to recognize that education was a critical economic development issue, business leaders returned to the education policymaking arena. Two main factors prompted their reentry into education politics, first with state-level politicians through the 1980s and subsequently at the federal level in the 1990s (especially after 1994) as federal involvement expanded. First, concerns over maintaining a well-trained workforce were paramount. This focus on economic competition, enhanced after *A Nation at Risk* appeared in 1983, was symbolized by increasing business requests that the federal government expand the available number of H1-B visas, which would allow firms to bring in more highly skilled workers from other nations (Goldberg and Traiman 2001).

The second factor, building in the mid-1990s and expanding business involvement at the federal level, was what American CEOs perceived as a painfully slow process of educational change occurring across the nation's 50 states. That observation proved especially frustrating because the path to improvement that business leaders favored, holding students to higher standards, appeared so obvious to them by that time. These views emerged in sharp relief at the 1996 national education summit when several business executives stormed out of a meeting amidst what they believed was unnecessary political hair-splitting by the nation's governors. Reflecting on that event and debates over educational standards in 2001, Susan Traiman, Director of the Education Initiative at The Business Roundtable (BRT) explained to me, "The business community recognizes that based on our nation's politics and history that education is a state and local function. But it is maddening to business leaders that all of the states have to figure this [standards] out on their own."

The intersection of the business community's return to state education politics in the late 1970s and 1980s, and subsequent federal attempts in the 1990s to borrow strength from the states to expand federal involvement in education set in motion important dynamics in national politics. The political leverage that business leaders provided to federal reformers from both major parties is hard to understate.

A crucial early event in business' transformation in national education politics occurred in June of 1989 when President Bush spoke at the BRT headquarters in Washington, DC. According to Traiman, "At that meeting [Bush] challenged the CEOs to get involved in education. The CEOs said 'yes,' but in saying that they didn't really know what 'yes' meant. So they spent a year thinking about it; thinking about how big companies—because that's what the BRT is made of—could have positive influence. They saw the place that they could get involved was in state policy, not federal. State policy was creating the infrastructure for reform." Most critically, that infrastructure contained standards and testing systems that were beginning to take shape, and would provide a key leverage point to extend federal involvement in the nation's schools.

In 1994 and subsequent years, President Clinton found a natural ally in the business community when he pressed for his Goals 2000 program to support state efforts to develop standards and a new ESEA linked to those standards. Throughout the 1990s, Clinton and his

advisers engaged in systematic efforts to warm business leaders to the idea that federal policy could properly borrow strength from the states to accelerate the standards movement. Part of this strategy involved reaching out to state and local business groups. From his position at the National Alliance of Business (NAB), Milton Goldberg described to me how this frequently worked: "When Dick Riley was secretary [of education], his staff would often call over here. If Riley was going out to give a speech they'd call in advance and ask us who the business leaders [involved in education] were in the community, what they were working on, what their interests were. So when Riley would go out to a place like Indianapolis, for example, he could talk about these things in his speech."

Attempts by Riley and other Clinton advisers to engage business created important political capital for the administration. Those political resources proved especially valuable after Republican electoral successes in 1994. Business executives, who tended to ally with Republican politicians in state and federal politics, pushed state leaders to stay focused on standards-based reform and, in essence, attenuated some of the influence that national Republicans and their Contract with America had over these state politicians. Business leaders helped to keep the states moving ahead and provided a counterweight to groups on the political right that opposed standards-based reform. Some business leaders even "threatened to withhold campaign contributions [from state politicians] if states did not keep reforms on track."⁸

By 2001 and unlike never before, business leaders, acting through organizations such as the BRT, NAB, and the Business Coalition for Excellence in Education became important players on education in the federal legislative process. They remained committed to educational standards; and because they saw how federal involvement could help state accountability systems to develop and mature, they supported federal policy that borrowed strength from the states. Comparing this advocacy in 2001 for a stronger federal role to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's position in 1965 during the first ESEA debate reveals business' evolution on education in stark relief. Not only do business leaders now stand firmly behind expanded federal efforts, significantly, they are also better positioned to assert greater influence in future political debates over federal policy.

Federal education agendas and institutional politics inside the Washington Beltway

Unlike the segmented portrayals that appear in high school civics textbooks, political scientists have increasingly come to appreciate the overlapping, rather than separate, nature of the three branches of American national government. Charles Jones calls this organization a "separated system," and argues that grasping how American government actually operates "logically requires attention to the institutional context within which any one part of the system does its work" (Jones 1994, p. 284). Jones's formulation provides great insight for understanding the last four decades of education politics between the White House and Congress, the two major political houses on Pennsylvania Avenue.

⁸ The quote comes from my interview with John Barth. My interviews with Susan Traiman and Kati Haycock also explored examples of business influence on state-level politicians, something that Haycock called a "strategic romancing" of the nation's governors.

Years of congressional dominance

For nearly 25 years after the first ESEA became law, Capitol Hill politicians and their staffs tended to dominate federal education policy vis-à-vis the White House. In the separated system, presidents were largely overmatched for three main reasons.

The first reason was the local nature that characterized federal education policy during these years. With its grants and other programs, most federal policy was essentially organized around complex formulas that allocated to states and school districts annual bundles of money. The peripheral and programmatic federal approach made it difficult for presidents to wrap their arms around the federal policy apparatus. In contrast, members of Congress were (and still are) hugely attentive to the particular benefits that flowed to their districts or states, and they worked doggedly to maintain this reliable annual dose of pork. Thus, federal education policy provided members with numerous opportunities to please their constituents and, by teaming with colleagues to defend mutually popular programs, to build support in Washington. Congressional scholars have noted generally how these two activities help members to achieve the twin goals of electoral success and influence on Capitol Hill (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974).

On funding formulas specifically, John Barth, a veteran of congressional and executive branch education politics, described to me their critical importance because they "gave members of Congress something they could take home to their constituents. When I worked on the Hill, every time there was a proposal for a tweak in the funding formulas it'd lead to 435 CRS [Congressional Research Service] analyses about how it would affect each congressional district. That plays a formidable role in the political debate." Given that presidents occupy the only at-large political office in the United States, they simply lack the incentive and the institutional resources to maintain this level of attention to the cacophony of federal education programs on the books. Without an overall organizing scheme for federal efforts, which would come later with standards, presidents remained at a disadvantage in their wrangling with members on Capitol Hill.

A second related reason emerges from Congress's oversight function. From 1965 to 1989, even though presidents certainly considered education in formulating and defending their annual budgets, relative to Congress they lacked the passion and capability to perform the detailed program oversight that many members of Congress relish. Not only do members hold regular hearings to discern the trajectory of specific programs, many also develop strong loyalties to programs that they helped craft. Those preferences become grilled into their staffs who keep a watchful eye over proposed changes that might harm a particular member's sacred cow. Chester "Checker" Finn described to me how these staffers, many fresh out of college, "are programmed by the people they work for to pay attention to those things—to defend the Checker Finn School Uniform Program. Or to make sure that others are there to support it; so when Checker Finn retires it becomes the Paul Manna School Uniform Program." That congressional dominance of the policy debates persisted during the 1980s despite stagnating federal education budgets during the early part of the decade.⁹

⁹ Even though Ronald Reagan demonstrated increasing interest in education in his major speeches during this time, substantively he eschewed the policy details and pushed for educational block grants.

A final reason why congressional politicians tended to dominate education policymaking in the 25 years after the first ESEA was due to important institutional changes on Capitol Hill. During the early 1970s, congressional reforms allocated to members more staff resources and dispersed power among committee and subcommittee chairs, creating a newly empowered cadre of leaders (Smith and Deering 1990, pp. 45-54). Those institutional changes emerged amidst the Watergate affair and shortly before the relatively ineffective presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Thus, an increasingly capable and independent Congress combined with generally ineffective presidents who had little interest in education enabled Congress to hold the upper hand in this and other policy areas. Christopher Cross, former Republican staff director on the House education committee, described to me a conversation that captured quite succinctly this relative balance of power: "I can recall Al Quie saying to me in about 1973-74 that he felt no reason to support the White House [education] proposals just because he was the ranking member [of the House education committee]."¹⁰

If congressional dominance characterized education politics in the separated system up through the end of the 1980s, by the early 1990s things began to change. By then, federal license to become more involved in the nation's schools had grown; presidents possessed a more visible and effective bully pulpit with the maturing Department of Education; while still maintaining dozens of individual programs, federal involvement in education became more coherently organized around policy to support education standards that affected all students; and citizens more generally began voicing support for an expanded federal education agenda.

Taken together, those changes have helped presidents to improve their negotiating position on education relative to their colleagues on Capitol Hill. Even though presidents by no means dominate national education politics, with substantial media attention focused on the White House and more institutional resources at their disposal, presidents' powers of persuasion, arguably their most significant advantage in the nation's separated system (Kernell 1993; Neustadt 1980 [1960]; Tulis 1987), have expanded. And as a result, they now enjoy greater opportunities to convince the public and other policymakers to see educational issues from their point of view. That does not mean that all presidents since 1989 have enjoyed significant political success on education, as the experiences of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush illustrate.

Presidents gain traction as the federal education agenda expands¹¹

George H. W. Bush's presidency is frequently characterized as a series of missed opportunities. Observers identify the president's failure to leverage his astronomically high approval ratings after the Persian Gulf War into more control of the Washington policy agenda and reelection in 1992. Even though Bush convened the Charlottesville education summit shortly after taking office, a watershed event in American educational history, for several reasons, some owing to his own judgment and others beyond his control, he was unable to build on the momentum in education that he appeared to possess in 1989.

¹⁰ Many thanks to Christopher Cross for reminding me of these issues.

¹¹ Jennings (1998) provides a detailed description of the political dynamics between the White House and Capitol Hill during the 1990s. This section draws heavily on his analysis and my personal interviews.

Figure 3, which compares public support for presidential candidates on education during the three most recent election cycles, suggests as much. That figure's first panel shows that Bush appeared to be competitive on education early in the 1992 campaign (perhaps owing to residual support for his efforts at Charlottesville) but by election day his Democratic rival, Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, had captured the issue. Those electoral troubles mirrored some of the previous difficulties that Bush's education agenda experienced on Capitol Hill.

Figure 3 here

Bush's first problem was that his education secretary, Lauro Cavazos, who was a holdover from the Reagan administration and served Bush until December 1990, was generally an ineffectual cabinet member. Cavazos never capitalized on the bully pulpit that Terrell Bell and William Bennett, both education secretaries during the Reagan administration, had helped to establish in the fledgling federal education department during the 1980s. Thus, after Charlottesville, and during the very time that Bush could have been building his political capital and using it to advance his education initiatives with Congress, he lacked a persuasive spokesperson. Even though Bush's second education secretary, Lamar Alexander, was a strong replacement, he took office in March 1991, ending the position's three month vacancy that included much of the buildup to and prosecution of the Persian Gulf War. Perhaps Bush could have enjoyed more of a post-war bounce on education had he possessed an effective secretary during this period.

The second problem that prevented Bush from gaining leverage with Congress on education was the political pinch that persistently dogged him during his term. Bush never warmed to the conservatism that Reagan and Reagan's most vociferous supporters espoused, even while seeing himself as the de facto heir to the previous administration. That tight spot was reflected in suspicions from congressional Republicans who saw his embrace of voluntary national education standards anathema to their commitment to pull back the federal role in education. Combine those criticisms with others from Democrats on Capitol Hill who opposed Bush's support for expanded educational choice and it is not difficult to understand the president's political predicament.

Third, unlike every other president to have served after 1965 (including Gerald Ford), Bush is the only chief executive never to have had the opportunity to work through an ESEA reauthorization. It is hard to understate the importance of that fact of the nation's legislative calendar given that the "secular time" in which presidents govern can powerfully constrain or enable their ambitions.¹² The ESEA reauthorization process is critically important because it provides a natural opportunity for policymakers to reshape federal policy and claim credit for successes with the voting public. Absent this opportunity, Bush was forced to assume the more difficult task of building this policy momentum on his own, something that he and Alexander attempted to do with the president's America 2000 strategy, which they proposed shortly after Alexander joined the administration. That plan, which reached out to conservative Republicans

¹² (Skowronek 1997, p. 30) explains the relationship between secular time and presidential performance this way: "Presidential leadership in secular time will refer to the progressive development of the institutional resources and *governing responsibilities* of the executive office and thus to the repertoire of powers the presidents *of a particular period* have at their disposal to realize their preferences in action." (My emphasis.)

by including increased educational choice and greater local control of education, was nevertheless killed in a Senate filibuster led by the chamber's most conservative GOP members (Schwartz and Robinson 2000).

Finally, Bush provoked resentment among many members up the street on Pennsylvania Avenue when he decided to ignore Congress during the buildup to the 1989 Charlottesville summit and the subsequent development of national education goals (Vinovskis 1999). Even though the president possessed good reasons for this decision, in hindsight it may have prevented him from building needed political bridges to Capitol Hill that would have paid long-run dividends. With conservatives opposing his agenda and Democrats controlling the House and Senate education committees, it is no wonder that Bush failed to have much policy or political traction on the issue inside the Washington Beltway, even as the national education goals and the NEGP that he helped to design served to catapult forward reform efforts across the nation's 50 states.

Overall, despite greater license to act and a maturing bully pulpit on education, Bush's poor strategic choices and the circumstances confronting his administration compromised his ability to enjoy greater political and policy success with Congress, even though those successes appeared within reach after the Charlottesville summit.

Unlike Bush, President Bill Clinton used education to achieve significant political and policy successes in his dealings with Congress, helping to establish more balance between the two branches. Substantively, Clinton was a formidable player in Washington's education policy debates during the 1990s. He was a key leader at the Charlottesville education summit where he helped the governors persuade President Bush to support national education goals.¹³ He was intimately familiar with the details of education and the trajectory of policy change in the states. And in the White House he assembled an experienced education team. Clinton's only education secretary, former South Carolina governor Richard Riley, was known nationally and regionally (through the important Southern Regional Education Board) as an educational leader. Michael Cohen, one of Riley's top advisers at the Department of Education before becoming an assistant secretary there, had been the National Governors' Association (NGA) staffer who helped the governors develop their pre-summit strategy in 1989.

It is important to remember that Clinton's most significant education policy achievements—reorienting the ESEA toward an emphasis on standards, and passing Goals 2000 to support that effort—occurred in 1994 when Democrats controlled the House and Senate. Even though some congressional Democrats chafed at Clinton's linkage of the ESEA to state academic and performance standards without forcing states to provide additional resources to schools, they did share the president's affinity for education programs and spending. As Table 1 shows, Clinton's fellow partisans favored the 1994 reauthorization with overwhelming majorities in both houses. That support was critical given that Republican support sank to a level unseen since the first ESEA of 1965.

¹³ One of the greatest ironies of Bush's presidency is that he invited Clinton to attend his 1990 State of the Union speech, where, on account of Clinton's efforts at Charlottesville, the president openly praised the man who eventually would deny him a second term.

Table 1 here

It is unclear whether a standards-driven ESEA and the Goals 2000 architecture to support it would have become law had Republicans controlled Congress in 1993 and 1994. However, if the GOP's performance on education after the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 is any guide, there is little evidence that they would have been able to completely eviscerate Clinton's education agenda. Republicans suffered from two major liabilities on education during the 1990s, which allowed the president to cut into congressional dominance of the issue.

First, and most significantly, the Republicans espoused an education message that contradicted the preferences of the nation's citizens.¹⁴ Figure 4 shows that by the early 1990s and up through 2000 public opinion began to mirror elite views about the national importance of education. That public support emboldened Clinton, who relied heavily on going public and opinion polling—sometimes "daily polling," according to a former Clinton education official—with added license to assert a more aggressive federal role.¹⁵

Figure 4 here

The public relations problem that Republicans suffered was severe. Reflecting on the 1990s, one GOP congressional staffer told me, "The Republicans had said what they wanted to do on education, but they didn't explain it very well. People saw their positions and thought that the Republicans were calling for the elimination of public education or something like that." After Clinton had secured a second term, moderate Republican House member Michael Castle of Delaware, himself a past governor associated with education reform, argued that "Most of the [Republican] proposals [in 1995 and 1996] began with the words 'abolish,' 'eliminate,' or 'cut.' Thus, Americans were left with the impression that Republicans wanted to eliminate the federal role in education" (Jennings 1998, p. 175).

Those political missteps not only alienated potential GOP supporters, but they also boomeranged to activate opposing forces. As Gerald Sroufe of the American Educational Research Association explained to me, "Past arguments that the Republicans had made about eliminating the Department of Education forced the coalition favoring it and federal programs to come together." Sroufe said that those groups "did telemarketing campaigns to raise awareness." Joel Packer, a veteran lobbyist with the NEA agreed, telling me that "in 1995 and after when the Republicans took over control of Congress, fights over education increased the importance of the federal role in the public's mind." That helped to build support for greater federal interest and involvement in education, the very outcomes that Republicans opposed.

A second related liability was that after 1994 the education vision of GOP leaders on Capitol Hill conflicted with the preferences of two important party constituencies: the business community and Republican governors. When congressional Republicans proposed killing Goals

¹⁴ Many of my interview respondents reflected on the disconnect between Republican positions in the 1990s and general public sentiment regarding education.

¹⁵ Interview with Gerald Tirozzi. On presidents and their use of public opinion, see (Geer 1996) and (Kernell 1993).

2000 in 1995, Clinton and his team met with leaders of the BRT to help preserve the law. In a parallel development, at the NGA's annual meeting in 1995, Republican governors Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin and John Engler of Michigan, and IBM's chief executive officer Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., the meeting's keynote speaker, opposed eliminating Goals 2000 and the National Education Goals Panel (Broder 1995).¹⁶ Clinton's strategy of borrowing strength from the states with Goals 2000 and the ESEA helped him to minimize state-level Republican opposition to his plans and, thus, provided him with added leverage in his dealings on Capitol Hill.

Across his two terms, when Clinton clashed with Capitol Hill Republicans on education the results nearly always broke in his favor, and sometimes with great political impact. Debates over the federal budget for fiscal year 1995 provide a poignant example. During that budgeting cycle, Clinton firmly resisted proposed Republican cuts to education (and other areas). Betting that the president would blink first, House and Senate Republican leaders refused to relent. The standoff lasted well into 1996 and ended up shutting down nonessential (but frequently popular) federal functions, which dealt a disastrous political blow to the Republicans just as the gears of the 1996 election season began churning. As the second panel of Figure 3 shows, Clinton completely dominated education against his Republican rival, Senator Bob Dole, during the 1996 presidential campaign season.

After Clinton's reelection in 1996, Republicans began to realize how their education positions had disadvantaged them both nationally and in their battles against the White House. That recognition turned Clinton's second term into an educational bidding war. If one omits the GOP's successful challenge to a one-time \$5 billion school construction proposal that Clinton included in his fiscal year 1998 budget, Republicans actually appropriated more money for K-12 education than Clinton had requested in each year of his second term. This contrasted with his first term when in three of four years (even when Democrats controlled Congress), appropriations were lower than the president's requests (U.S. Department of Education 2002).¹⁷

In short, across his tenure, Clinton's education successes were essentially the product of his own political acumen and policy knowledge, the incompetence of his rivals, and the opportunities available in his times. Taken together, his ability to engage a national public interested in a greater federal role in education, to leverage the institutional capacities and bully pulpit of the executive branch, and to inject greater coherence into the ESEA by aligning it with standards-based reform (while simultaneously supporting new programs that polled well) helped him to increase the White House's influence on education vis-à-vis Congress.

During the first year of George W. Bush's presidency, the former Texas governor continued in Clinton's footsteps and enjoyed much success in education policy debates with Congress. Like Clinton, Bush had been a southern governor associated with educational reforms. Entering the White House with those bona fides, Bush's plans carried significant weight with congressional Republicans, many of whom had opposed similar and less prescriptive proposals when Clinton held office. In part, Bush's ability to move GOP members toward his position owed to his strong showing on education in the 2000 campaign. Even though he by no

¹⁶ My interview with Susan Traiman also addressed these issues, as does (Jennings 1998, pp. 158-160).

¹⁷ Many thanks to Donna Wong for helping me to interpret these numbers.

means dominated the issue, as Figure 3's third panel shows, he made up significant ground on education relative to his father in 1992 and Dole in 1996.

Bush's opportunities to lead and his personal ability on education made him more like Clinton and much less like his father on the issue. First, unlike the first Bush administration, the second commenced with an immediate opportunity to enjoy concrete policy success on education given that the latest ESEA reauthorization was over a year past due. Second, during 2001, even though Bush's education secretary, former Houston schools superintendent Rod Paige, was relatively ineffective in dealing with Congress and only a marginal player in the development of the No Child Left Behind Act,¹⁸ the president himself was personally able to compensate for Paige's weaknesses or to rely on skilled aides, such as Sandy Kress, and key congressional lieutenants. Their efforts proved especially important after the attacks of September 11, 2001 when Bush shifted much of his attention to terrorism. Conversely, Bush's father lacked these sorts of allies when Cavazos proved lackluster.

Thus, given the opportunities in 2001 and his experience in education, Bush was able—nearly single-handedly according to some of my interview respondents—to move congressional Republicans toward his position. His power to persuade was quite strong, and he used it masterfully. In an interview, Sally Lovejoy, Republican Chairman John Boehner's top staffer on the House education committee, described to me the president's influence in light of the party's missteps during the 1990s: "Back in 1994, we [Republicans] came in and cut the crap out of education. We were against the existence of the Department of Education. Battles over education spending were part of the government shutdown [of 1995 and 1996]. So those were the positions of the hard core conservatives. We didn't dig ourselves out of that hole until Bush. He got the Republican Party out of this slump on education."

With accountability, flexibility, and choice the key buzzwords animating Bush's education program, congressional Republicans, with the exception of a small handful still committed to eliminating the federal role, warmed to Bush's approach. Bush's Capitol Hill allies, such as education committee chairman John Boehner (R-OH), provided the president with savvy advice throughout the legislative process and helped him to build bipartisan bridges to other key House and Senate members, including George Miller (D-CA) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA). While the new president had hoped to hold the line on education spending, he possessed a strong negotiating position and, like many Democrats on the Hill, favored toughening the standards and accountability provisions that existed in the 1994 version of the ESEA. Democrats did block school vouchers and win more funding than Bush preferred, but the president willingly compromised on those issues given that the centerpiece of his program, testing in grades 3 through 8, remained intact.

* * *

¹⁸ During the No Child Left Behind debate, Kress let slip to a reporter that Paige was "a little bit on the periphery" of the administration's discussions (Scheiber 2001, Internet). Interview respondents both on and off Capitol Hill commented on Paige's relative ineffectiveness with Congress, but sometimes acknowledged his leadership skills in other settings.

Overall, this paper has demonstrated how expanding federal and state education agendas have changed more than the content of federal and state education policy. First, state actors continue to work in education policy environments that almost four decades of federal involvement and their own interactions with officials in Washington have shaped. Second, the communities of organized interests in and around the Washington Beltway have both responded to and promoted greater federal interest and involvement in the nation's classrooms. And finally, because federal policy supporting standards and testing for all students now reaches more coherently into the nation's schools than the cacophony of federal education programs prior to the 1990s ever had, the political stakes associated with federal involvement are now much higher. That has helped to pique the interest of presidents who have expanded their influence and become more co-equal players and persuaders on education in the nation's separated system.


Based on the evidence presented here it is clear that E. E. Schattschneider's pithy insight about policymaking and politics remains on target. Since 1965, new education policies have continued to produce new education politics across the American federal system.

Appendix on Interview Data

Table A1 provides a complete list of my interview respondents, their positions, and when the interviews occurred. With only a few exceptions, I conducted all of the interviews in person. They ranged in length, but most lasted approximately 40 minutes. I took handwritten notes and then, immediately after the interview whenever possible, typed them up to reconstruct a transcript of the discussion.


Table A1 here

Figure 1. Revenues for K-12 education by source of funds, 1939-40 to 1998-99 school years




Note: Beginning in 1980-81, revenues for state education agencies are excluded. Beginning in 1988-89, data reflect new survey collection procedures and may not be entirely comparable with figures for earlier years.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2002, Table 157).

Figure 2. Federal financial and personnel support for state education agencies (SEAs), state fiscal year 1993



Source: Adapted from General Accounting Office (1994).

Figure 3. Public confidence in presidential candidates on education, 1992 – 2000




Note: Question wordings and sponsoring organizations vary across polls reported here. However, all questions mention both presidential candidates by name and ask some variant of the question "Which candidate do you think would do a better job handling education?"
Source: Lexis-Nexis POLL database.

Table 1. House and Senate votes on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and reauthorizations

Year	House % voting "yea"		Senate % voting "yea"	
	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats
1965	27	80	56	93
1967	77	82	96	95
1970	89	81	100	91
1974	74	84	72	93
1978	90	98	86	97
1988	99	100	98	100
1994	19	98	53	100
2001	85	97	94	88

Note: Cells are calculated as the percent of those voting "yea" out of all members voting "yea" or "nay."
Source: Adapted from Jennings (1998, pp. 127-8), and supplemented with data from 2001.

Figure 4. Adults identifying education as one of the most important problems facing the United States, 1960 – 2000



Note: Each data point represents the percent of respondents identifying education as one of the most important problems facing the United States. Question wording has varied slightly across some of these years. Contact the author, or consult the NES codebooks for details on these minor differences.
Source: Author's analysis of National Election Studies data (various years).

Table A1. Interview respondents.

Respondent	Position at time of interview	Date of interview
Gordon Ambach	Executive Director (Retired), Council of Chief State School Officers	Jan. 25, 2002
John Barth	Acting Executive Director, National Education Goals Panel	Nov. 2, 2001
Buzz Bartlett	President and Chief Executive Officer, Council for Basic Education	Jan. 30, 2001
Lisa Bos	Education Reform Project Director, Republican Study Committee, US House	Mar. 1, 2002
Michael Cohen	Senior Fellow, Aspen Institute	Oct. 23, 2001
Christopher Cross	Immediate past President and Chief Executive Officer, Council for Basic Education	Jan. 15, 2002
Charles Edwards	Senior Editor, <i>Title I Monitor</i> and <i>Title I Handbook</i>	Oct. 11, 2001
Elizabeth Fay	Legislative Assistant, Sen. Evan Bayh (D-IN)	Feb. 21, 2002
Milton Goldberg	Executive Vice President, National Alliance of Business	Dec. 11, 2001
Siobhan Gorman	Reporter, <i>National Journal</i>	June 11 and Oct. 4, 2001
Mark Gaul	Chief of Staff, Rep. Mark Green (R-WI)	June 13, 2001
Dana Gray	Legislative Assistant, Rep. Lynn Rivers (D-MI)	June 7, 2001
David Griffith	Director of Governmental and Public Affairs, National Association of State Boards of Education	March 26, 2002
Kara Haas	Legislative Assistant, Rep. Michael Castle (R-DE)	June 14, 2001
Samuel Halperin	Founder and Senior Fellow, American Youth Policy Forum	Jan. 22, 2002
Janet Hansen	Vice President and Director of Education Studies, Committee for Economic Development	Dec. 12, 2001
Kati Haycock	Director, The Education Trust	Feb. 6, 2002
Carnie Hayes	Director of Federal-State Relations, Council of Chief State School Officers	Oct. 19, 2001
Bruce Hunter	Associate Executive Director for Public Policy, American Association of School Administrators	Oct. 30, 2001
Nathalia Jaramillo	Consultant, Council of the Great City Schools	Nov. 27, 2001
John (Jack) Jennings	Founder and Director, Center on Education Policy	Dec. 5, 2001
Craig Jerald	Senior Policy Analyst, The Education Trust	June 7, 2001
Krista Kafer	Senior Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation	Dec. 20, 2001
Michael Kennedy	Legislative Assistant, Rep. Thomas Petri (R-WI)	June 12, 2001
Victor Klatt	Vice President, Van Scoyoc Associates	Nov. 12, 2001
Erika Lestelle	Legislative Assistant, Rep. Bob Schaffer (R-CO)	Mar. 15, 2002
Dane Linn	Director of the Education Policy Studies Division, Center for Best Practices, National Governors' Association	Nov. 1, 2001

Table A1. (continued)

Sally Lovejoy	Director of Education and Human Resources Policy, Committee on Education and the Workforce (Republican staff), US House	June 13, 2001
Jay Mathews	Staff Writer, <i>Washington Post</i>	June 13, 2001
Jeff Mazur	Legislative Assistant, Rep. Ron Kind (D-WI)	June 6, 2001
Alex Medler	Acting Director, Public Charter Schools Program, US Department of Education	May 30 and June 15, 2001
Alex Nock	Legislative Associate, Committee on Education and the Workforce (Democratic staff), US House	Feb. 19, 2002
Billie Orr	President, Education Leaders Council	Feb. 14, 2002
Joel Packer	Lobbyist, National Education Association	Mar. 25, 2002
Shawn Pfaff	Graduate student, La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison	Apr. 24, 2001
Kris Pratt	Legislative Director, Rep. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)	June 11, 2001
Jacqueline Raphael	Research Associate, Education Policy Center, Urban Institute	June 8, 2001
Diane Stark Rentner	Associate Director, Center on Education Policy	June 7, 2001
Michael Resnick	Associate Executive Director, National School Boards Association	Dec. 10, 2001
Andrew Rotherham	Director, 21 st Century Schools Project, Progressive Policy Institute	Oct. 5, 2001
Jorge Ruiz-de-Velasco	Research Associate, Education Policy Center, Urban Institute	June 8, 2001
Cheryl Sattler	Editor, <i>Title I Monitor</i> and <i>Title I Handbook</i>	Oct. 11, 2001
David Shreve	Program and Committee Director for Education, Labor, and Job Training, National Conference of State Legislatures	Nov. 21, 2001
Mike Sommers	Legislative Director, Rep. John Boehner (R-OH)	June 7, 2001
Gerald Sroufe	Director of Government Relations, American Educational Research Association	Oct. 23, 2001
Michele Stockwell	Legislative Assistant, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)	Feb. 19, 2002
Kathleen Strottman	Legislative Assistant, Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-LA)	June 8, 2001
Gerald Tirozzi	Executive Director, National Association of Secondary School Principals	Dec. 21, 2001
Thomas Toch	Writer in Residence, National Center on Education and the Economy	Jan. 15 and Jan. 23, 2002
Susan Traiman	Director, Education Initiative, The Business Roundtable	Feb. 4, 2002
Michael Usdan	Senior Fellow, Institute for Educational Leadership	Nov. 14, 2001
Dustin Valerius	Education Policy Analyst, Education Leaders Council	June 15, 2001
Courtney Weise	Legislative Director, Rep. Jim DeMint (R-SC)	Mar. 4, 2002
Art Wise	President, National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education	Dec. 7, 2001
Donna Wong	Budget Analyst, Congressional Budget Office	June 13, 2001

Note: Two additional respondents wished to remain anonymous.

References

- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bell, Terrel H. 1988. *The Thirteenth Man: A Reagan Cabinet Memoir*. New York: The Free Press.
- Broder, David S. 1995. "Just Plain Dumb." *Washington Post*. August 2: A25.
- Chamber of Commerce of the United States. 1965. "Letter to Members of the House of Representatives on Federal Aid to Elementary and Secondary Education Legislation." March 17.
- Chubb, John E. 1985a. "Excessive Regulation: The Case of Federal Aid to Education." *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (2): 287-311.
- Chubb, John E. 1985b. "The Political Economy of Federalism." *American Political Science Review* 79: 994-1015.
- Derthick, Martha. 2001. *Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Fenno, Jr., Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Geer, John G. 1996. *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- General Accounting Office. 1994. "Education Finance: Extent of Federal Funding in State Education Agencies (GAO/HEHS-95-3)." October. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Goldberg, Milton, and Susan L. Traiman. 2001. "Why Business Backs Education Standards." In Diane Ravitch (ed.), *Brookings Papers on Education Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Hill, Paul T. 2000. "The Federal Role in Education." In Diane Ravitch (ed.), *Brookings Papers on Education Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Jennings, John F. 1998. *Why National Standards and Tests? Politics and the Quest for Better Schools*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Jones, Charles O. 1994. *The Presidency in a Separated System*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Jung, Richard, and Michael Kirst. 1986. "Beyond Mutual Adaptation, into the Bully Pulpit: Recent Research on the Federal Role in Education." *Educational Administration Quarterly* 22 (3): 80-109.
- Kaagan, Steve, and Michael D. Usdan. 1993. "Leadership Capacity for State Reform: The Mismatch between Rhetoric and Reality." *Education Week*. May 5: 36+.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1993. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Manna, Paul. 2001. "Education Policy Change and Bottom-up Agenda Setting." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 19-22, Chicago, IL.
- Manna, Paul. 2002a. "Federal Education Policy and Partisan Politics." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 25-28, Chicago, IL.

- Manna, Paul. 2002b. "Federalism, Agenda Setting, and the Dynamics of Federal Education Policy." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29 - September 1, Boston, MA.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- McDermott, Kathryn A. 2002. "Can State Education Agencies Lead Reform? Politics, Administration and the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29 - September 1, Boston, MA.
- National Center for Education Statistics. 2002. *Digest of Education Statistics, 2001*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- National Conference of State Legislatures. 2001. "Letter to Congressional Conferees Regarding the Re-Authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act." September 26.
- Neustadt, Richard E. 1980 [1960]. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Salisbury, Robert H. 1990. "The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington--More Groups, Less Clout." In Anthony King (ed.), *The New American Political System*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Scheiber, Noam. 2001. "Rod Paige Learns the Hard Way." www.tnr.com. June 21. Accessed on July 24, 2001.
- Schwartz, Robert B., and Marian A. Robinson. 2000. "Goals 2000 and the Standards Movement." In Diane Ravitch (ed.), *Brookings Papers on Education Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Smith, Steven S., and Christopher J. Deering. 1990. *Committees in Congress (2nd Ed.)*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Timpane, P. Michael, and Laurie Miller McNeill. 1991. *Business Impact on Education and Child Development Reform*. New York and Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development.
- Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. *The Rhetorical Presidency*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- U.S. Department of Education. 2002. "Budget History Tables." <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/BudgetHistory/>. November 26. Accessed on January 24, 2003.
- Vinovskis, Maris A. 1999. "Development of the Six National Education Goals and Creation of the Panel to Oversee Them." November. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Education Goals Panel.